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BRITAIN AND THE FRENCH RESISTANCE 1940-1942: 
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Dr. John D. Treadway 
During the Second World War, the relationship between Great Britain and 
the French Resistance endured endless problems. From the early days of the war, 
both sides misunderstood the other and created a stormy relationship, which 
would never mature later in the war. The French Resistance, initially small and 
generally fractured, frequently focused on postwar political maneuvering rather 
than wartime military tactics. Unification was sporadic and tenuous. Charles de 
Gaulle offered himself as the leader of the Resistance but lacked experience. This 
thesis also shows, however, that the British clung to the London-based de Gaulle 
hastily in the early days of the war but quickly decreased their support of him. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was de Gaulle's most ardent supporter, 
disp1ayed ambivalence and frustration with the general. Fellow resisters and the 
British understandably viewed de Gaulle as a symbol more than a serious leader. 
This natural link between the British and French Resistance failed to develop into 
a mature relationship and precluded the chance for fuller strategic cooperation in 
major Allied invasions of French territory in November 1942 and June 1944. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the Second World War, the French Resistance failed to unify or 
work effectively with Charles de Gaulle, the movement's symbolic leader. The 
Resistance maintained a troublesome relations with Great Britain. Neither side 
overcame a series of conflicts, battling egos, and internal confusion. As a result, 
Britain and the Resistance never developed a mature relationship that could aid 
the Allied invasions of French North Africa in November 1942 (Torch) and 
Normandy in June 1944 (Overlord). The British lacked a unified policy toward the 
French Resistance. Acting out of a sense of desperation and isolation, the British 
clung to de Gaulle in the early days after the German Blitzkrieg but later came to 
question their support. Building up de Gaulle while keeping other options open, 
the British pursued conflicting goals, confusing not only policy toward de Gaulle 
and the Resistance but also fostering internal disagreements within the offices of 
the prime minister and foreign secretary. 
Over the past fifty years, glorification of the Resistance developed into a 
popular myth about the courageous French citizens who risked everything in order 
to regain their sovereignty. The term "Resistance" enhanced this myth because it 
projected an oversimplification of the nature of the phenomenon and implied a 
unified movement. It is a term of wide definition, referring to many groups and 
methods of resistance. Noble or opportunitistic motivations, size, political or 
1 
3 
Wartime conditions posed constraints on documenting clandestine activities. 
Resisters maintained tight security and seldom wrote down instructions, missions, 
and contacts. Underground movements avoided publicity.2 A resister only knew 
the true identity of his or her immediate superior. Fear of the Gestapo, 
infiltrators, and exposure overshadowed every detail of daily life. 
Continuing intra-French divisions and the reluctance of postwar French 
governments to release material on the Resistance has restricted use of primary 
sources. Personal accounts are valuable in examining the innermost workings of a 
network or problems facing the entire movement but reflect glorifications and 
animosities.3 The memoirs of Charles de Gaulle (The Complete War Memoirs of 
Charles de Gaulle, Vols. 1-3) and Anthony Eden (The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, 
Earl of Avon: The Reckoning) exemplify how each author's inevitable subjectivity 
and hindsight must be read cautiously. Historian Gordon Wright wrote about the 
lack of balance in some historical studies. "Continental scholars, for example, are 
inclined to give central attention to the various anti-Nazi resistance movements, 
2See, for example, Foreign Office note, 15 May 1944, Public Record Office, 
FO 371, 318/41924. Hereinafter PRO. 
3See, for example, Andre Heintz, interview, Remembering D-Day: Fifty Years 
Later, C-SPAN, 7 May 1994. Hereinafter Heintz, interview. Heintz represents a 
decreasing number of resisters still living who can add to the oral history of the 
Resistance. C-SP AN heavily utilized this interview for the Resistance perspective for 
its Normany commemoration. Its use here illustrates both the positive and negative 
aspects of oral history and hindsight. 
4 
either within Germany or in the occupied countries; while most Anglo-American 
historians have dealt with the underground in rather offhand fashion."4
The most valuable primary sources for this thesis have been British 
documents released in the 1990s supplementing those released in the 1970s, which 
was the last time a thorough analysis of Britain's relations with the Resistance 
could be undertaken. These documents show that a conflict within Britain 
paralleled one within the Resistance. 
Avoiding glorification without minimizing personal sacrifices presents the 
challenge when examining the problems surrounding Britain and the Resistance. 
Chapter one examines the rise of the Metropolitan, or continental, Resistance, 
Charles de Gaulle's relationship with the Metropolitan Resistance, and the 
fractured state of the Resistance, by the time the Allies had prepared to launch a 
major military invasion. Chapter two analyzes the circumstances surrounding de 
Gaulle's arrival on the international political scene. British actions during the fast­
paced, crisis-ridden days surrounding the fall of France created confusion toward 
de Gaulle and mounting frustration with his irritable nature. British and 
Resistance operatives competed for military and intelligence operations in 
Metropolitan France. 
4Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War: 1939-1945 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1968), 336. 
The events and perceptions that arose in the early part of the war led to 
the exclusion of de Gaulle in the active planning and execution of important 
military invasions of French territory later in the war. Power struggles and a lack 
of cohesion typified intra-Resistance behavior. Resistance leaders still spoke of 
individualism on the eve of the Normandy invasion.5 One British Foreign Officer 
recorded a dinner conversation with two Resistance leaders. "Each Resistant had 
to make an individual choice, to examine his conscience and accept the technical 
position of a rebel" before fraternity of all resisters could emerge. 6 Resisters 
refused to concentrate on the immediate military objective of liberating France 
and prematurely focused on their political position in the administration of 
postwar France. Wartime conditions, inexperience, personal vendettas, and 
political competitions precluded both a unified and effective Resistance and a 
cohesive and consistent British policy toward the Resistance. 
5 
5J. M. Baegner of the French Embassy in Angorra, which joined the Free
French, first objected to the Free French movement because it sought to unify all 
French people, which countered French individualism and every person's right to 
decide on the type of country France should be after the war. Translated from 
Baegner memo, 9 July 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28213. See also Sir M. Lampson, 
Cairo, memo, 11 Feb. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 2870/114/17. 
6Rooker's notes on dinner with Frenay and Bertain of Combat, 31 May 1944, 
PRO, FO 371, 82/41906. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE UNKNOWN WARRIORS 
The German Blitzkrieg in the West began on 10 May 1940. Within a 
matter of weeks, much of western Europe capitulated to Hitler. Over the next five 
years the French Resistance struggled to emerge. Resister Pierre Guiilan de 
Benouville stated, ''This is no war of chieftains or of princes, of dynasties or 
national ambition; it is a war of peoples and causes. There are vast numbers ... 
whose names will never be known, whose deeds will never be rewarded. This is a 
War of the Unknown Warriors.1 These unknown warriors came from diverse 
social and economic backgrounds, resisted at different times and in different ways, 
held varying objectives, and formed hundreds of small resistance networks. 
Neither a centralized power structure nor a uniform alliance existed with Charles 
de Gaulle or the British, which undermined the role of resisters in military 
operations. One popular myth that, from the beginning, nearly every French 
citizen sought to resist both Germany and Vichy France is false. In September 
1941, the British Foreign Office estimated that only 100,000 people in France 
rejected Vichy's policy of collaboration and supported the Resistance.2 The 
1Pierre Guillan de Benouville, The Unknown Warriors: A Personal Account
of the French Resistance, trans. Lawrence G. Blochman (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1949), 8. 
2W. H.B. Mack note, 4 September 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28214. 
6 
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movement contained some noble, selfless citizens and many eleventh-hour patriots 
and opportunists. 
Reactions to the Franco-German armistice of 22 June 1940 and the 
Resistance evolved from a mindset that developed after the First World War. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill commented, "France had conducted and carried 
the main weight of the terrible land fighting from 1914 to 1918."3 This mentality 
relied on falsehoods, ignorance, and strategic errors. French defensive military 
doctrine centered around archaic trench warfare, a mode of fighting that ended 
with the First World War. The Maginot Line, a defensive barrier constructed after 
the First World War between France and Germany, ended before France's 
northern border. There the French relied on protection from either the thick 
Ardennes Forest or her Belgian neighbor, whose neutrality had been guaranteed 
in a 1839 treaty, even though this route was the traditional path of enemy 
invasion. French awareness of German offensive rearmament and modem 
mechanization failed to respond with sufficient material and organization. 
Although initially trampled by the Germans in the first part of the Great War, the 
French eventually emerged victorious with Marshal Petain, the Victor of Verdun, 
christened a national hero. The French believed a defensive strategy 
complemented their notion that they would prove triumphant in future wars. 
3Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, vol. 2 of 'Ihe Second World War 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 35. 
8 
France also maintained a weak offensive political doctrine and supported the 
Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, which were unstable 
democracies in the 1920s and authoritarian regimes in the 1930s. 
Additionally, interwar French governments failed to inspire the population 
and faced considerable opposition in the 1930s. Twenty ministries rose and fell in 
the years between 1932 and 1940. The Popular Front, a coalition government of 
Left and Center parties from 1936 to 1938, represented for many the last hope for 
a revitalized France. Its failure climaxed popular weariness of leaders who lacked 
direction and succumbed to corruption. Leon Blum, former leader of the Popular 
Front, believed fear of rightist groups, government soldiers, German troops, and 
the loss of jobs and privileges caused the decline of the Third Republic.4
Rebuilding after the Great War had been a heavy burden, and the nation was 
unable to cope with the modem preparation required for another war. Edouard 
Bonnefous stated, "Morally, the nation was not ready, on the morrow of a long 
and hard conflict, to sacrifice its hopes for a higher standard of living in order to 
prepare for a new war which many did not believe to be in the offing. "5
4Milton Dank, The French Against the French: Collaboration and Resistance 
(New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1974), 32. Blum later encouraged socialists, who 
feared de Gaulle's reactionary nature, to rally to the general. New York to 
Foreign Office, 18 December 1941, PRO, FO 371, Z10717/10376/17. 
5Edouard Bonnefous, "Political and Military Responsibilities for the Defeat 
of 1940," The Fall of France, 1940: Caw;es and Responsibilities, ed. and intro. 
Samuel M. Osgood (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972), 133. 
9 
The lightening war of 1940 enhanced an unstable political situation and left 
the French people without a sense of direction. Historian M. R. D. Foot described 
the French quandary: 
Was it best to accept the fact of German domination 
and collaborate, or to follow the aged marshal in an 
attempt at an independent policy, or to resist? If to 
resist, with what object-to restore the third republic, 
or one of the monarchies; or to build a new kind of 
France, and if so with marxist or Christian or agnostic 
inspiration? And under American or British or 
Russian or purely French sponsorship? And under 
which French military leader?6
The final downfall of the moderate government of Paul Reynaud began on 
10 June 1940, when the government departed from Paris and relocated further 
west and finally settled in Bordeaux. With a pacifist attitude securely embedded in 
the French majority, the scene was set for a leader who could symbolize the 
nostalgia, stability, honor, and enduring peace France had desired for so long. 
Charles de Gaulle obsetved, "Just as a besieged fortress is near surrender as soon 
as the governor talks of one, so France was heading for an armistice because the 
head of her government officially contemplated one. "7 The people looked to 
Petain as the only viable alternative. His past glories validated his view of patriotic 
6M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British
Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1966), 133. 
7Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle,
Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1964), 70. 
10 
action. Petain favored a negotiated peace to save an independant government for 
even part of France. 
The armistice divided the country into two geographic zones. The "Zone 
Occupee" or Occupied Zone comprised the northern and western coastal areas. 
The "Zone Libre" or Unoccupied Zone comprised the southern area. In the latter, 
Petain established the Etat Fran9ais at Vichy and an Armistice Army. Many 
resisters and non-resisters understood Petain's reasoning for peace. Resister 
Philippe de Vomecourt expressed a common ambivalence: 
However shameful some of us considered the 
armistice, we could not deny that the terms seemed 
curiously mild and almost sympathetic in their regard 
for French feelings. If it were possible to judge it 
purely from a military standpoint, it was not 
dishonorable. The Germans did not demand the 
surrender of the French fleet, only its demobilization. 
They allowed sovereign rights to a French government 
in the free zone, and even to the retention of an army 
of 100,000 men on the soil of Metropolitan France. 
Furthermore, the armistice left the empire intact.8 
The apparent invincibility of the Germans as a military force procured the French 
population's easy acceptance of the armistice. In 1938, Hitler annexed parts of 
eastern Europe. In 1939, Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the 
Soviet Union, which divided Poland. The following year, the Wehrmacht blitzed 
8Philippe de Vomecourt, An Army of Amateurs (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1961), 54. 
11 
through western Europe. The Battle of Britain represented the next step toward 
the creation of a German New Order in Europe. 
The French of both the occupied and unoccupied zones felt impotent 
before the invincible Nazi war machine. In the words of resister Henri Michel, 
"Since the nation in arms had failed to dam the Nazi flood, how could the 
disarmed civilian population sweep the waters away, or indeed prevent them from 
spreading further? And how much more impossible still to reverse the flow!"9
Hitler's leniency in the agreement coupled with his desire to eliminate Great 
Britain temporarily benefitted the Vichy government. Many French thought Petain 
was the savior of French sovereignty and responsible for a lenient armistice. The 
real reason, of course, was that Hitler wanted to tum his attention to mounting a 
surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the armistice divided French 
geography and opinion. Propaganda promoted faith in the Marshal who as head 
of the Etat Fran�ais had his people's best interests at heart. With "Travail, 
Famille, Patrie" replacing the 1789 motto of "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite," the path 
of peace and cooperation meant the average French citizen could focus on the 
more immediate concerns of job security and supporting a family. 
Marshal Petain's infamous meeting with Hitler at Montoire in October 
1940 produced mixed results for both Vichy and the Resistance. The meeting 
9Henri Michel, "The Psychology of the French Resister," Contemporary 
History 5, no. 3 (1970): 165. 
12 
defined a portion of France as part of the Nazi war effort. Pro- and anti-Vichyists 
assigned great symbolic importance to the Petain-Hitler handshake. Reactions 
covered both extremes. Henri Michel commented: 
[some] sympathized with fascism, to whom that 
prospect was welcome; others were simply lured by the 
manna which the occupiers distributed; and lastly, 
there were some who were inspired by nobler motives, 
who went over to the victors not from sympathy, but 
from pacifism-to put an end to the horrible and 
catastrophic Franco-German hectacombs.10
Many military officers became devoted supporters of Vichy and Petain's national 
revolution. For Michel, it was a program based "upon the ideology of traditional 
French reaction with a few fascist trimmings."11 Resisters and some non-resisters 
viewed it as the ultimate defeat, with their image of the old Marshal destroyed. 
To others, Petain's refusal to involve France in the war against England 
encouraged a double game theory. Petain, though outwardly cooperating with 
Hitler, was waiting for the right moment to reassert French sovereignty and end 
submission to Hitler, perhaps even in conjunction with the Resistance. This 
allowed for a certain continuity with the interwar mentality. Some citizens 
preferred to excuse Petain and instead blame his colleagues for the armistice, such 
as Vice-Premier Pierre Laval, whom many disliked and distrusted. 
10Ibid.
11lbid., 163.
13 
Turning away from Vichy, however, did not necessarily mean increased 
support for the Resistance or a more unified direction among resisters. Many 
resisters, who had been anti-German yet pro-Vichy, realized only slowly that 
Petain would not tum against Hitler. Henri Frenay, who later became the leader 
of a large Resistance network, was one of those people: "Despite growing and 
indisputable proofs, I felt a sort of repugnance to admit to myself that the old 
Marshal, whatever his intentions, was actually serving the enemy."12 Years later 
Petain stated that people on both sides misrepresented his reasons for meeting 
Hitler at Montoire. Petain intended to compare himself with Tsar Alexander I 
who, Petain believed, had over a century before pretended to accept Napoleon's 
friendship while conspiring against him. Petain sought to keep the Germans out of 
Spain, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. He followed the lead of 
Generalissimo Francisco Franco, whom Hitler visited prior to Montoire.13 Franco 
reluctantly bargained with Hitler and avoided active participation in the war. 
Just as a Vichy spirit existed before the creation of the regime, a 
Resistance spirit preceded its development but with greater difficulty. Former 
resister Henri Michel's psychological prerequisite for resistance was non-existent 
among the majority of the French population: 
12Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, trans. Dan Hofstadter (Great Britain: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), 97. 
13Sisley Huddleston, Petain: Patriot or Traitor? (London: Andrew Dakers, 
1951), 81. 
14 
In any army the combatants need to be given reasons 
for fighting, although they have not been consulted 
before being involved in it; and it is even more 
necessary to enlist public opinion, without whose 
support the combatants would become as weak as 
Antaeus when his feet were off the ground.14 
Many resisters regarded the Etat Fran�ais as an occupying force similar to the 
Germans in the Zone Occupee. Unlike their partisan counterparts in the Soviet 
Union but similar to those in Yugoslavia, French resisters had no government 
providing military, political, or moral support. Never fully occupied, the Soviet 
Union and Stalin exercised some organization and control over partisans. With 
past leaders a disappointment or part of Vichy, no well-known leaders emerged to 
direct a resistance. Self-appointed network chiefs, supported by a few friends and 
followers, struggled to assert their credibility and influence beyond network 
borders. 
Free French official Andre Pleven wrote to the British Foreign Office that 
although a majority of people desired an Allied victory, only 10 to 15 percent of 
the population were ready to risk their lives for the cause. 15 Although this figure
represented a few million people, they remained scattered and unorganized in an 
14Michel, "Psychology," 159. 
15Translated from Andre Pleven to Major Desmond Morton, 11 Feb. 1942, 
PRO, FO 371, 699/32033. Pleven believed that number also represented true 
Gaullists. Morton thought Pleven's projections were too speculative regarding the 
support of the Free French in France. Morton to Mack, 13 Feb. 1942, PRO, FO 
371, 699/32033. See also Spears note, 18 Feb. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 699/32033. 
15 
occupied country. The number of people involved in the Resistance constrained 
its ability to recruit and to act. Philippe de Vomecourt, one of the few actively 
involved in clandestine activities, described the need for considerable caution. 
"Ultimately an underground movement is sustained by trust, not suspicion. A 
traitor lives by gaining the trust of those he intends to sell. "16 
This constant strain among those trying to work together under already 
difficult circumstances affected intra-Resistance relations and performance. 
Relative inexperience and isolation meant most resistance groups arose 
spontaneously. A few friends gathered to talk about the war and how they could 
impede the Germans. Often newspapers appeared as the first sign of a new 
network, making writers and journalists prime recruits. The dissolution of many 
societal barriers, such as political parties, trade unions, and cultural associations, 
by Vichy and the Germans benefitted the Resistance's development. New forms of 
cooperation between those of diverse social strata emerged. In both zones, 
resisters emerged from all walks of life, including aristocrats, professionals, 
industrial workers, and merchants. According to Michel, early resisters also 
possessed vivid memories of the First World War and a hatred of Germans.17 
Members of the intelligentsia were among the first, albeit unarmed, 
resisters. Writers conveyed a spirit of resistance and provided a starting point for 
16Vomecourt,Anny, 85. 
17Michel, "Psychology," 166-67. 
16 
motivating other resisters who preferred military action. Historian James 
Wilkinson found the intelligentsia a consistent source of rebeJlion: "The ideals to 
which the Resistance intellectuals rallied were traditional ones: freedom of 
expression, freedom of conscience, the defense of human dignity, aU as set forth 
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789."18 
Although collaborationist literature existed in France, such as Jacques 
Benoit-Mechin's La Moisson de quarante, it was the authors in opposition to the 
Germans and Vichy who came to dominate the literary scene. Jean-Paul Sartre 
wrote several works, including Bariona ou le fils du tonnerre and Les Mouches,
which described his disgust with the prevalent mood of guilt and uncertainty 
among the population and its refusal to react to the contemporary situation. 
Sartre later joined with Albert Camus, Paul Eluard, and Edith Thomas in the 
formation of Socialisme et Liberte, a literary Resistance group. Les Editions de 
Minuit, the most important clandestine publisher, produced Agnes Humbert's 
Notre Guerre, a diary of her days with the early Resistance group Musee de 
l'Homme, and several short stories by Jean Bruller, a.k.a. Vercors. Bruller's La
Silence de la Mer is the story of an uncle and his niece forced to host temporarily 
a German officer in stubborn silence.19
18James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 45-46. 
19In describing his relationship with the German officer, the old man said, 
"We never gave, nor did he take, anything remotely like an opening for 
17 
Men and women joined the Resistance to participate in the salvation of 
France. The most expedient way to liberate France required the networks to put 
aside differences since each represented only a fraction of the population. 
Resisters, however, lost sight of the immediate goal of liberation and allowed their 
political aims to take precedence. Diverse ideological objectives and 
methodologies altered basic military strategies. Conflicts arising within one zone 
added to differences between the Zone Occupee and the Zone Libre. 
In the initial stages of development, resistance networks in the Zone 
Occupee received more support than those in the Zone Llbre. The incessant 
reminder of the Nazi troops and the restrictions these aliens imposed on every 
day French life fostered germanophobia. Daily German military parades from the 
Arc de Triomphe down the Champs-Elysees humiliated Parisians. Direct German 
domination provoked acts of sabotage. Some resisters tore down German 
propaganda posters placed jn Metro stations and on the streets while others 
denied recognition of the foreigners. Agnes Humbert proudly witnessed a 
Frenchman refuse a German soldier's offer of cigarettes.20 The predominance of 
German forces in the Zone Occupee meant a higher risk and a greater difficulty 
in the formation and maintenance of networks. Resisters quickly learned the 
familiarity." Vercors, The Silence of the Sea, trans. Cyril Connolly (New York: 
Macmillan, 1944), 11. 
20Agnes Humbert, Notre Guerre (Paris: Editions Emile-Paul Freres, 1946), 
20, 27. 
18 
fundamental rules of underground activity, such as never write down incriminating 
evidence, remain calm in any crisis, and respect instincts. Resistance operatives 
learned to be conscious of every move made and word spoken. Still, innate 
behavioral habits sometimes gave people away. Peter Leslie described one 
incident. 
A woman agent parachuted into France and was 
caught by an alert Gestapo officer in Paris after he 
had noticed her involuntarily looking to the right 
before crossing a busy street-instead of to the left like 
everyone else. The officer recalled that traffic in 
Britain kept to the left of the road, and deduced that 
anybody automatically checking on vehicles coming 
from that direction must be English.21 
Boris Vilde led the "Musee de l'Homme", one of the first groups in the 
Zone Occupee. Created in Paris in July 1940, many of its members worked at the 
Musee de l'Homme in the Chaillot Palace opposite the Eiffel Tower. Vilde built 
an extensive network of contacts in a short period of time. His comrades helped 
escaped French and Allied prisoners safely across the demarcation line to the 
Zone Libre and eventually out of the country. On 15 December 1940, the group 
published its first issue of the newspaper Resistance, which instructed the people 
of France in the preparation and methods of insurrection. A double agent ended 
Musee de !'Homme in early 1941, but the group inspired other networks. One 
21Peter Leslie, The Liberation of the Riviera: The Resistance to the Nazis in 
the South of France and the Story of its Heroic Leader, Ange-Marie Miniconi (New 
York: Wyndham Press, 1980), 15-16. 
19 
evening immediately prior to his arrest, Vilde showed up on the doorstep of 
Agnes Humbert knowing the risk he took returning to Paris. In response to 
Agnes's words of concern, he replied, "Ma chere, nous irons tons en prison, vous 
le savez."22 
The Germans eventually occupied the Zone Libre in November 1942, in 
Operation Attila, after the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, 
codenamed Operation Torch. Even then, however, fewer German soldiers 
occupied the Zone Libre than the Zone Occupee, allowing southern networks to 
develop more easily. After examining daily life and the relative ease of movement 
in the south, a visiting Resistance leader from the Zone Occupee commented, 
''The Resistance leaders go about openly, meet in cafes and busy restaurants, not 
making the slightest effort to hide. They all but have calling cards bearing their 
underground titles. "23 The disaffected and rebellious members of the middle and 
upper class elites led the Resistance even though the working class constituted 
much of the core of the networks. 
Resistance groups created in the Zone Libre promoted political aspirations 
foremost. They wanted to expel the Germans, rid the country of the foul Etat 
Fran�ais, and look to the establishment of a new progressive France. North and 
22Humbert, Notre Guerre, 65. 
23John F. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History
of the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1976), citing Pineau, La Simple Verite, 21. 
20 
south often conflicted. In contrast to the north, the south's political goals 
overshadowed paramilitai:y operations, which were kept to a minimum until the 
arrival of the Allied armies. The prevailing Petainist attitude of the populace 
restrained violent resistance. If potential agitators kept quiet, reprisals could be 
avoided. Therefore, resources first had to be directed toward persuasion and 
unification of French attitudes in favor of the Resistance. Oandestine newspapers 
were of the utmost importance in the Zone Libre. In the words of one resister, 
the "press was the only thing which gave to an individual in one part of the 
counti:y the feeling that he was a part of a national organization, (a fact) which 
was capital from the standpoint of morale. "24
De Benouville related another difficulty he faced in the eyes of French 
collaborators. He held a post in the Vichy regime, a cover many resisters found 
useful25 but awkward: 
The treason of some of these old-time nationalists, 
although it was just beginning, increased the risk of 
capture for true patriots. Our former comrades were 
not only bitter about our refusal to bow to defeat. 
They were resentful of the old internal political 
quarrels which had caused some of us to resign from 
the Action Fran�se before the war, and which 
neither the heat of the conflict nor its tragic outcome 
24-f emoinage of Bourdet, in Sweets, Politics of Resistance, 43. 
25For example, 11Noyautage de I' Administration Publique" consisted of 
senior civil seivants positioned in the central and local governments. 
could make them forget. They were out to attack us 
with ever-increasing fury.26 
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Resisters in the Zone Llbre had to fight their fellow countrymen, more so than 
those in the Zone Occupee, as well as the Germans. A resister had to feel a 
strong belief in his or her convictions, especially at the hands of fellow Frenchmen 
such as the Vichy police. 
Marie-Madeline Fourcade, the only woman to head a major Resistance 
network, began "Alliance" in 1940 in the Zone Llbre. The espionage-oriented 
Alliance first supplied the British with locations of German military installations 
and troop movements. Fourcade's network later supplied the Allies with a 
detailed map of the Normandy coast used in the 1944 invasion and information 
about German research in Brittany on the secret V-1 weapons. By the end of the 
Second World War, Alliance's 3,000 members branched out all over France. 
Fourcade maintained contacts in Spain, Monaco, England, and Belgium. Alliance 
fascinated the Germans who nicknamed the organization Noah's Ark because 
members had code names of animals. Fourcade was "Hedgehog".n 
"Combat", "Liberation", and "Franc-Tireur" were the three most important 
groups to emerge in the Zone Llbre, and their leaders played a significant part in 
26De Benouville, Unlazown Warriors, 14. 
27Vera Laska, ed., Women in the Resistance and in the Holocaust, fore. 
Simon Wiesenthal (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 137-38. 
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the unification of the Resistance. They also exemplified important characteristics 
of the Resistance movement as a whole, including the participation of diverse 
social groups, the crossing of established social barriers, and the damaging 
political struggles. Henri Frenay, a former career officer, created Combat, the 
most organized and heterogenous of all the early Resistance networks. He drew 
recruits from the disaffected military, Christian Democrats, intellectuals, workers, 
Communists, and former members of the royalist and fascist aligned Action 
Fran�aise, including Pierre Guillan de Benouville. Combat published a clandestine 
newspaper, Verites. Leftist intellectual-journalist Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie 
led Liberation and published a socialist newspaper, Le Populaire. Liberation 
maintained ties with the political parties and trade unions Confederation Generale 
du Travail, Confederation Fran�aise de Travailleurs Chretiens, and Comite 
d' Action Socialiste. Franc-Tireur was the most radical and politically experienced 
network. Led by Jean-Pierre Levy, a Jewish technician, the group spoke out for 
democratic and republican principles in its newspaper, Le Franc-Tireur.28 
Resistance leaders may have understood the need to unite against the 
common enemy of Germany and Vichy, but distinctions protracted or prevented 
28Sweets, Politics of Resistance, 38-40, 46. The British actually found all 
resistance newspapers, not just those of the socialists and communists, to be 
uncompromisingly leftist in outlook. Further, each group considered itself worthy 
to speak for France and control her future while remaining equivocal and 
suspicious of Allied intentions. Foreign Office Summary of Oandestine Resistance 
Press 1 Jan. to 14 July 1943, 26 Aug. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
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consolidation. Leaders refused to tone down their individual rhetoric. Continued 
publication of numerous ideologically diverse newspapers increased competition 
between the networks and impeded the process of unification. De Benouville 
discussed how the lack of a centralized command caused operational problems 
with rank-and-file resisters who overlapped one another on the same mission: 
I had great difficulty making our men understand the 
first principles of intelligence: that no agent should 
transmit the same information to two different 
organizations feeding the same point .... [S]light 
differences in the text of the two versions would give 
the central intelligence point the idea that the two 
messages confirmed each other, whereas they were 
ac tually only duplications. Our men, however, were 
over eager, and once they had stumbled on a piece of 
information they were in a hurry to pass it on.29
This typified the French Resistance's natural inexperience, poor internal 
communication, and inability to keep resisters from joining more than one 
network. Debates over methodology and the role of active operations 
accompanied differences over ideology. De Benouville emphasized the difficulties: 
"So, while some crews were busy putting out newspapers, others broke the store 
windows of collaborationists.1130 
The ambiguous position of the French Communists in the early years of 
the war confused the Resistance movement. Changes in French Communist 
29De Benouville, Un/aiown Waniors, 96. 
30Ibid., 55. 
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behavior between 1939 and 1941 grew out of fluctuations in official Soviet policy. 
The marginal position of the Communists in the Popular Front government of the 
late 1930s changed with an agreement between the French and Soviet 
governments against the common threat of Hitler. The Communists joined the 
Socialists and Radicals without formally entering the government. Henri Michel 
described the change in attitude: 
[T]hey spoke with a completely new voice; they 
demanded a firm attitude toward Hitler, called for 
armed intervention on behalf of Republican Spain, 
repudiated the Munich agreements, and favored the 
broadest possible national unity and an "outstretched 
hand to the Catholics. 11 Like the socialists, they had 
discovered in their turn that they possessed a 
fatherland. 31
Soon, however, diplomacy changed Communist rhetoric and split the party 
with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. French Communists had 
to follow the Soviet strategy of preserving a Communist peace and denouncing the 
war as a conflict between rival imperialist powers. A clandestine press produced 
propaganda opposing the war and Petain's regime, organizing defense groups, and 
denouncing de Gaulle and his followers in London as "dangerous warmongers in 
the pay of England."32 According to Michel, the Communists unsuccessfully 
attempted to justify this sudden change: 
31Micbel, "Psychology," 171. 
32Claude Chambard, The Maquis, trans. Elaine P. Halperin (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 23. 
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[The] USSR being the fatherland of the workers of all 
the world, its defense was both the duty and the 
interest of the workers of every country .... We can 
be sure that none of them enjoyed making this 
reversal of policy; many of them left the party, while 
those who had been mobilized loyally performed their 
duty. And those who remained faithful to the party 
were, at the very least, demoralized and confused.33
Those who disobeyed Stalin's orders frequently joined networks such as Levy's 
Franc-Tireur. In some parts of France, the Communists controlled the Franc­
Tireur military wing. In the "red belt" of factories around Paris, the Communists 
organized strikes.34 Other French Communists and the Soviet government 
disapproved of this breach in loyalty, and ostracized many of them permanently 
from the party. 
When Hitler broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 22 June 1941 with his 
surprise attack on the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, another sharp tum in 
the official Communist attitude occurred. Stalin immediately called for all-out 
opposition to the Germans and to Vichy. De Benouville saw the Communists as 
enthusiastic resisters who despite the embarassment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact "had become Men of the Resistance, and these sons of France were not sorry 
to find themselves fighting beside their brothers for the cause they had not yet 
33Michel, "Psychology," 171. 
34M. R. D. Foot, Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945 (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 239. 
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been able to serve. "35 Despite Communist vacillation early in the war, many 
Communist networks managed to put politics aside, at least on the surface, for the 
duration of the war. Michel wrote how the Communists avoided intra-Resistance 
struggles which did not directly concern them: 
Being very anxious not to weaken French unity or to 
diminish the national combativeness to the occupiers' 
advantage, the Communists took great pains not to 
alarm their partners. They avoided all references to 
their revolutionary programme and postponed to the 
end of the war any examination of the extensive 
reforms that their Gaullist and socialist partners were 
advocating.36
The Communists attracted large numbers of recruits, including non­
communists, because they spoke out for unity and direct action. They invited the 
Left and the Right to join the Front National, the most militant network.37 The 
emphasis on action, though a by-product of a political philosophy, appealed to 
resisters who yearned to fight the oppressor. Their ability to mobilize rapidly 
increased the Front National's strength and influence and would make it one of 
the most powerful Resistance groups in France by 1943. 
A network developed also within the Armistice Army. Although loyal to 
Petain, the Conservation du material hid military material for future use. 
35De Benouville, Unknown Warriors, 40. 
36Michel, "Psychology," 172. 
37Sweets, Politics of Resistance, 121, 123. 
Conseivation du material maintained a clandestine fleet of military trucks 
camouflaged as civilian transport vehicles, attempted to unify and control local 
initiatives aimed at stockpiling weapons, and constructed crude armored scout 
cars. 38 Historian· Robert Paxton described the position of army resisters: 
[T]he clandestine planners in the Armistice Army were 
a small, dispersed group condemned to no share in 
national glory, unless the metropolitan Armistice Army 
itself were to play a major role in the liberation of 
France. Instead, the metropolitan Armistice Army was 
destined to be dissolved in November 1942. The 
strategic planners within its general staff were planning 
for situations which never arose.39
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Many army resisters had ambitious plans, but their ambiguous position 
restrained their activities. Influential senior officers helped determine Vichy policy 
and opposed rash violations of the Armistice agreement. The need to keep anti­
government activities secret made communicating with resisters outside the Army 
difficult. Their loyalty to Petain precluded joining other networks or following 
anti-Petain leaders. They successfully horded military caches, which remained 
unknown until the Germans occupied the south in November 1942 and discovered 
the caches. The pacificism with which the Vichy officials accepted the occupation 
shocked the Army. Loyalty to Petain wavered. In an act of protest and resistance, 
38Robert 0. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps 
Under Marshal Petain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 284-85, 288. 
39Ibid., 308. 
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the Armistice Army destroyed its own fleet in the Toulon Harbor to evade 
German control.40 
Torch and Attila produced important psychological consequences. The 
former destroyed the myth of the unbeatable German war machine, and the latter 
eroded the myth of Petain's alleged double game. With all of France under 
German occupation, differing conditions for resistance in the Zone Occupee and 
the Zone Libre decreased. Where a divided France aided the Germans in the first 
half of the war, the two zones' common plight provided both a false glimmer of 
hope to the Resistance and added tensions as more militant movements emerged 
in the second half. 
A gradual shift of post-armistice attitudes away from Petain paralleled an 
increasing awareness of the failure of collaboration. Inept Nazi and Etat Fran�is 
propaganda disclosed to the French populace their truly subordinate status in the 
Third Reich's New Order. The Germans had not returned over one million 
French prisoners of war interned in Germany since 1940. Under Nazi pressure, 
Petain reappointed Pierre Laval to the Vichy government in April 1942. The 
Marshal had dismissed Laval in December 1940, but now with Petain losing his 
popular support, Laval was needed to help maintain order and power in the Zone 
Libre. Marshal Petain's public endorsement of Laval, who was openly pro-German 
40Chambard, Maquis, 31. 
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and, in effect, the true head of the Etat Fran�ais, lowered the prospects that 
Petain would reassert French sovereignty against the Germans. 
In February 1943, Laval instituted the Service du Travail Obligatoire, which 
conscripted all men between the ages of twenty-two and forty-two to forced labor 
in Germany. Stories describing the harsh conditions in the labor camps quickly 
circulated in France. Many workers ignored the summons and retreated to the 
countryside and forests where they formed the maquis.41 Small groups had existed 
since the armistice, but the Service du Travail Obligatoire led to a massive influx 
of maquisards. In the words of resister Gilbert Renault-Roulier, a.k.a. Remy, 
''without the seed planted in French soil for more than two years by the blood of 
this minority, many who took to the maquis would otherwise have meekly 
accepted forced labor in Germany."42 For several months, the Germans regarded 
maquisards as mere outlaws.43 When the Nazis realized the potential threat of the 
maquis, they created the "Milice", a special French police organization to root out 
maquisards. Rivaling the Gestapo in cruelty, Milice power expanded. 
41See Foreign Office note, 15 May 1944. 
42Gilbert Renault-Roulier (Remy), Memoirs of a Secret Agent of Free
France: The Silent Company, vol. 11, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1948), 335. 
43Tbe British defined the maquis as embracing "all groups of outlaws in 
France and their camps or hide-outs." Appreciation of Strength and Organisation 
of the French Maquis as at 26 January 1944, 26 Jan. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
82/41904. 
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Some maquis operated independently, while others affiliated with existing 
Resistance networks. Small maquis numbered about twenty people. This made 
movement more inconspicuous but fostered regional loyalties and a reluctance to 
join other maquis. Larger groups, however, proved unwieldy and exposed 
themselves to German attacks and infiltration. Philippe de Vomecourt described 
the maquis as "symptomatic of France divided, yet vengeful. "44
Maquisards believed that they represented the military branch of 
clandestine activities and would join an Allied liberation of the countryside. They 
quibbled about short- and long-term strategic objectives. Most non-communist 
maquisards saw their role in the war as one of diversion. They opposed engaging 
the enemy unless attacked or needed to carry out a mission. Non-communist 
fighters preferred to focus on preparation for an Allied landing and the postwar 
administration of France. Communist maquisards, many of whom drew inspiration 
from Soviet partisans, 45 sought to attack German soldiers and Vichy officials 
whenever possible. They mastered ambush, assassination, intrigue, and hit and run 
raids but showed little regard for casualties or German reprisals upon the civilan 
population. At liberation, the Communists wanted to be the only group that 
44De Vomecourt, Army, 127. The maquis and other armed resisters were 
"hopelessly intermingled and overlap[ped] each other to a very great extent. It 
[was] consequently very difficult to obtain any reasonable estimate as to the real 
strength of the Maquis Proper." Appreciation of Strength, 26 Jan. 1944. 
45See, for example, Speight interview with Madame d' Au brae, 23 March 
1944, PRO, FO 371, 318/41923. 
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consistently and actively fought the Germans, thereby discrediting non-communist 
resisters.46 Like other Resistance networks, both sides of the maquis, despite their 
emphasis on military action, proved susceptible to political ambitions. This would 
reduce their effectiveness as a fighting force and decrease their support with the 
local population and the British. 
The Resistance also existed outside of Metropolitan France. Charles de 
Gaulle created the Free French, later called la France Combattante or Fighting 
France/French.47 A few days before Reynaud's moderate government departed 
Paris on 10 June, de Gaulle, recently promoted to general, became Reynaud's 
Undersecretary of State for National Defense. Against the backdrop of the 
German Blitzkrieg, de Gaulle rose as the Third Republic fell. He exemplified a 
rare perseverance among government officials. He planned for the reemergence of 
an independent France and alleviated a sense of national humiliation felt by the 
surrender.48 
46Michael J. Bird, The Secret Battalion (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 
1964), 18. 
47La France Combattante was the union of French nationals who wanted to 
work with the United Nations toward the liberation of France, and the Conseil 
National Fran�ais was the directing organ that represented its interests with the 
British Government. Draft Statement for Publication, 14 July 1942, PRO, FO 371, 
31966. 
48Parr, Consul-General at Brazzaville, note, 10 March 1941, PRO, FO 371, 
22685/114/17. 
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[I]f the war of '40 is lost, we can win another. Without
giving up the fight on European soil as long as it is
possible, we must decide on and prepare for the
continuation of the struggle in the Empire. That
implies a policy to fit: the transport of resources to
North Africa, the choice of leaders qualified to direct
the operations, and the maintenance of close relations
with the British, whatever grievance we may have
against them. I propose to you [Paul Reynaud] that I
should deal with the measures to be taken for the
purpose.49 
De Gaulle's optimism and determination left those in control unaffected. 
He found Petain's interpretation of the war as just another Franco-German 
conflict short-sighted. The Marshal failed to grasp the ''world character of the 
conflict, the possibilities of the overseas territories, and the ideological 
consequences of Hitler's victory .... " In short, Petain showed his age, and for 
France, "[o]ld age is a shipwreck."50 
General de Gaulle arrived in London at dawn on 16 June 1940. In 
response to Petain's request for an armistice on 17 June, de Gaulle delivered his 
appeal to the French people over the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, on 
18 June: 
The leaders who, for many years past, have been at 
the head of the French armed forces, have set up a 
government. ... But has the last word been said? 
Must we abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and 
irremediable? To those questions I answer-No! ... I, 
49De Gaulle, Narrative, 54. 
SOJ:bid., 72-73. 
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General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French 
officers and men who are at present on British soil, or 
may be in the future, with or without their arms; I call 
on all engineers and skilled workmen from the 
armaments factories who are at present on British soil, 
or may be in the future, to get in touch with me. 
Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance 
must not and shall not die.51
For the few French citizens who heard de Gaulle's broadcast, 18 June emitted the 
spark for the next five years of the war. Isolated volunteers reached England daily, 
but only a few hundred had shown up by the end of the month to join General de 
Gaulle.52 Resister Andre Heintz spoke of the difficulty of supporting the general 
in France. "I was for de Gaulle, but he was in England. It was difficult to get 
instructions; our only communication came from BBC broadcasts. 1153
Other resisters distrusted de Gaulle and his self-appointed status as the 
movement's leader. De Gaulle garnered less popular support than many of the 
networks emerging in France.54 Resisters thought de Gaulle incapable of
comprehending the continental situation because he was not there on a day-to-day 
51lbid., 83-84. 
52lbid., 88, 90. 
53Heintz, interview. 
54Morton to Mack, 13 Feb. 1942; Spears note, 18 Feb. 1942. In contrast, a 
Swiss newspaper reported in March 1941 that 95 percent of Paris was Gaullist but 
then revised the initial tone of the stmy saying, "Gaullist sentiment is particularly 
strong in occupied France and indeed ... the great majority of the population are 
supporters of the cause." Report of Swiss Newspaper, 9 June 1941, PRO, FO 371, 
11/28213. 
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basis. Bitterness haunted de Gaulle's attempts to unify those French who resented 
his fleeing across the Channel. Some resisters found de Gaulle and his followers 
too narrow-minded. Henri Frenay, Combat leader, said the general viewed any 
refusal by network chiefs to subordinate their authority to him as a felony. De 
Gaulle was unable to understand that the network leaders were a vital connection 
between himself in London and the masses in France.55 Free French agents sent 
over to France could not appreciate the work of Metropolitan resisters and 
misinterpreted any network independence as treason. Historian Milton Dank 
described the situation: "Too strongly Gaullist in their thinking and resented 
because of their inability to supply money and arms in the quantities required, 
they simply added to the squabbling."56
Distrust of Charles de Gaulle and the politicians in London reinforced 
attitudes toward the Armistice and the Vichy puppet regime in many Frenchmen. 
Though eventually accepted, at least symbolically, as the primary leader of the 
Resistance struggle, many feared de Gaulle would establish a military dictatorship. 
Some British diplomats believed that "all French opinion wants a dictatorship, but 
a purely French one: they hoped for a man like de Gaulle of proved patriotism 
who would root out the old corruption, class and party struggles, and would 
55Henri Frenay, "De Gaulle et la Resistance," Preuves 10 (December 1956): 
84. 
56Dank, French Against the French, 132. 
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rebuild France on a new basis."57 De Benouville reflected upon his lasting opinion 
of the French leaders in London: 
I had serious reseivations regarding the French 
politicians who were regrouping in London. It was 
evident to one that the old political parties were 
bankrupt. They had failed in preparing for the war, 
they had failed at Munich, they had failed by 
capitulating to the Germans, and they were failing 
under the occupation. France, abandoned by those 
who had given her such false and feeble leadership, 
was finding her own way back to life and I viewed with 
suspicion the activities of the refugee politicians in 
London, who seemed ready to profit by the 
resurrection in which they played no part, but which 
might get them their old jobs back. Their actions 
seemed motivated by a desire to cling to their former 
status, rather than by any wish to restore liberty to 
France and, with it, to all of Europe.58
De Benouville's skepticism typified that of many French citizens. At the 
time of the Armistice, popular opinion reflected a belief that life could not 
become any worse than it had been under past governments and the German 
invasion. "The people who shouted 'Long live Petain!' were really shouting 'Long 
live Life!' For they remembered the roads caked with refugees, the 
bombardments, the days of exodus, and the nights of death."59 
57Francis Patron, Consul-General in Barcelona, to Madrid, 15 Oct. 1940, 
PRO, FO 371, C10842/65/17. See also Copy of Conversation with Philippe 
Bourdet, French First Secretary, 4 Sept. 1940, PRO, FO 371, C9891/65/17. 
58De Benouville, Unlazown Warriors, 55. 
59Ibid., 48. 
36 
De Gaulle also distrusted the Metropolitan Resistance and believed only 
he was qualified to lead France. "Against the enemy, despite the Allies, regardless 
of terrible dissensions, I would have to constitute around myself the unity of 
lacerated France."60 Before the war, the general viewed French defensive military 
doctrine and the Maginot Line as insufficient. The war proved him right. De 
Gaulle predicted that the Communists would be ready to unleash anarchy at 
liberation. Only a national liberation government under his guidance could stop 
them. "Such was my task! To reinstate France as a belligerent, to prevent her 
subversion, to restore a destiny that depended on herself alone. "61 In a meeting 
with Frenay and d' Astier, de Gaulle recalled, ''Their accounts emphasized the will 
toward organization and the pressure from the rank-and-file toward unity, but also 
the extreme individualism of the leaders, from which their rivalries resulted. "62
The general was unwilling to credit the efforts of the Metropolitan leaders or 
listen to their concerns. He sought instead to instigate his own unification with the 
help of Jean Moulin, a.k.a. Max, who assumed primary responsibility for the 
tremendous task of unifying the Resistance. 
Moulin went to London after the Armistice to solicit support and funding 
for some southern Resistance groups. Moulin returned to France in late 1941 as 
60De Gaulle, Narrative, 307. 
61lbid. 
62lbid., 346-47. 
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de Gaulle's delegate-general. He set out to coordinate and control support for a 
unified Resistance in Metropolitan France. Moulin found and organized the most 
dedicated resisters into cells of approximately seven men each. Upon an Allied 
invasion, the cells would form a secret army. Though a good idea on paper, the 
cells created problems. Each cell leader knew his immediate superior, but not his 
neighbor. Dewavrin, a.k.a. Passy, an associate of de Gaulle's in London, opposed 
the cell plan, calling it an example of de Gaulle's preference for propaganda over 
militant operations. 63 De Gaulle favored a policy of auentisme and showed a lack 
of confidence in the Resistance's ability to carry out successfully independent 
paramilitary actions. 
Moulin, with the help of Yves Morandat, spent 1942 in France laying the 
foundations for unification. Morandat's trade union experience complemented 
Moulin's intellectual, administrative, and business knowledge. They organized 
small acts of insurrection and built a framework for Resistance networks. Changes 
in Vichy policy and Nazi actions had spawned a dramatic growth in the Resistance 
and advanced Moulin's efforts. German repression and reprisals to Resistance 
activity began in late 1941 after the Communists joined the Resistance effort. 
Field Marshal Keitel's "Night and Fog" order of 7 December 1941 called for the 
instant execution of any non-German civilians guilty of crimes against the Reich 
or the occupying authorities. The Germans transported those accused to the Reich 
63Foot, SOE, 181. 
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for punishment when it was impossible simply to impose a death sentence through 
the courts. The term "Night and Fog" derived from the Gestapo's announcement 
of names but never the fate of those arrested. Deportations, usually at night, 
included many Jews.64 Historian M.R.D. Foot described its effect: "For every 
Frenchman or Frenchwoman that reprisal executions of this kind frightened into 
acquiescence, a score were shocked into opposition-in their hearts at least-and 
so became ripe for recruiting."M 
By the autumn of 1942, Moulin appeared ready to form a national 
organization. De Gaulle established a military coordinating committee, comprised 
of the "Armee Secrete" and "Groupes Francs", for southern France with Moulin as 
its president. The Armee Secrete would remain unarmed until an Allied landing. 
The Groupes Francs pursued immediate action directed toward embarassing but 
not harming collaborators. For example, resisters warned customers before 
blowing up a newsstand that sold collaborationist newspapers.66 The military 
coordinating committee first met on 11 November 1942, following Operation 
Torch. De Gaulle appointed General Charles Delestraint as commander-in-chief. 
Henri Frenay secured himself as the administrative advisor to the senior yet less 
64Chambard, Maquis, 28. 
MFoot, SOE, 177. 
66Sweets, Politics of Resistance, 37-38. 
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experienced Delestraint.67 Frenay's Combat forces made up a large part of this 
new military group, and his power play foreshadowed future quarrels with 
Delestraint. 
The initial results of Moulin's efforts to unite the Resistance would not 
occur until January 1943, after the Anglo-American invasion of French North 
Africa. By then, it was too late for the Resistance to play an active role in the 
campaign. The French Resistance would continue to display unstable 
characteristics throughout the war. Internal problems and external tensions with 
the British prevented a cohesive organization. An increased desire to unify 
coincided with the belief, as Michel stated, that "a purely military victory, without 
political significance, would be an incomplete victory."68 Resisters remained 
skeptical of de Gaulle's ambitions and methods, even though he served a purpose 
as a symbol of the Resistance and a regenerated France. De Gaulle would follow 
another plan to increase his power by pursuing relations, though equally 
contentious and tenuous, with the British. 
67Foot, SOE, 230. 
68Michel, "Psychology," 169. 
CHAPTER 1WO 
FROM DAYS OF CONFUSION TO DAZE OF CONFUSION 
On 28 June 1940, the British government recognized General Charles de 
Gaulle as the leader of all Free Frenchmen who rallied to him and the Allied 
cause. It was a desperate, superficial, largely vacuous act. The phrase "the year 
alone" has been used frequently to describe Britain in 1940 and 1941, between the 
fall of France and the entry of the United States into the Second World War. 
London played host to numerous governments-in-exile. For France, the British 
needed a symbol to counteract the myth of Petain and attract French citizens who 
opposed German rule. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been a vocal 
champion for France, believing the United States and Great Britain had 
mistreated France after the Treaty of Versailles. In and out of power since July 
1921, Churchill had consistently pressed for a treaty committing Britain to the 
defense of France, culminating in the spring of 1939 in a close military alliance. 
The British latched onto de Gaulle in the final days of the battle for 
France because the general ardently favored continuing the fight. John Colville, 
Churchill's Private Secretary, described the British need for de Gaulle: 
Charles de Gaulle was no more a Churchillian than 
Churchill was a Gaullist; but it may be said without 
undue exaggeration that Churchill created de Gaulle, 
though certainly not in his own image, and with still 
40 
less fear of contradiction that had it not been for 
Churchill, de Gaulle would in all 
probability have been discarded at an early stage in 
the war.1
41 
The British thought they could control de Gaulle, a newcomer to the international 
political scene, but de Gaulle proved them wrong. Desperation and calculation 
produced confusion. Official British words and actions reflected short-term 
concerns without thinking through long-term consequences. Combined with 
ambiguous rhetoric, uncertainty of de Gaulle's place in the overall war effort, and 
the general's irascible personality, a daze of confusion emerged and enveloped 
British policy toward de Gaulle. 
British War Cabinet minutes first mentioned de Gaulle on 9 June 1940. 
Churchill made reference to a conversation with the general held that afternoon. 
The new Undersecretary for National Defense gave the prime minister "a more 
favorable impression of French morale and determination,"2 than the rest of the 
old guard in the French government. When Churchill and Secretary of War 
Anthony Eden traveled to Briare on 11 June for a meeting with Reynaud, 
Churchill saw that only Reynaud and de Gaulle wanted to continue the fight 
1John Colville, Winston Churchill and His Inner Circle (New York: 
Wyndham Books, 1981), 247. 
2Great Britain. War Cabinet (Minutes), Conclusions (of Meetings), 9 June 
1940, 159( 40). Churchill mentioned the young general and urged Roosevelt's 
support a few days later. Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the 
Secretary of State (Hull), 12 June 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1940, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), 247. Hereinafter cited FRUS. 
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against Germany.3 Eden wrote of the French government's reaction to Churchill's 
statement that Britain would fight on, even if alone, "Reynaud was inscrutable and 
[commander-in-chief General] Weygand polite, concealing with difficulty his 
skepticism. [Vice-President of the Council] Marshal Petain was mockingly 
incredulous. Though he said nothing, his attitude was obviously C'est de la 
blague."4
On 13 June, Churchill related to the War Cabinet another meeting he had 
that day in Briare with Reynaud, who asked Churchill to release France from her 
pledge not to seek a separate peace so that he could arrange for an armistice. The 
two men agreed to appeal once more to President Franklin Roosevelt who had 
not responded to Reynaud's previous appeal for help of 10 June. Later that day, 
Churchill received a copy of Roosevelt's response to Reynaud's 10 June letter. 
[T]his government is doing everything in its power to 
make available to the Allied governments the material 
they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still 
more are being redoubled. This is so because of our 
faith in and our support of the ideals for which the 
Allies are fighting . .. It is most important to 
remember that the French and British fleets continue 
mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans; also to 
3Churchill, Finest Hour, 159. 
4The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: The Reckoning (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 133. 
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remember that vital materials from the outside world 
are necessary to maintain all armies.5 
Churchill wrongly inferred American action in the near future. The 
message "came as near as possible to a declaration of war and was probably as 
much as the President could do without Congress. The President could hardly 
urge the French to continue the struggle, and to undergo further torture, if he did 
not intend to enter the war to support them."6 The War Cabinet concluded: 
[A]lthough the implications of the message might be
clear to the Anglo-Saxon mind, they might appear in
rather a different light to the French, who would be
looking for something more definite. It would be
necessary to point out to them that the message
contained two points which were tantamount to a
declaration of war-first, a promise of all material aid,
which implied active assistance; and second, a call to
go on fighting even if the government was driven right
out of France.7
The French, however, better understood the ambiguities, implications, and 
lack of commitment in the American response. Reynaud sought a firm declaration 
5Secretary of State (Hull) to the First Secretary of Embassy in France at 
Tours (Matthews), 13 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 1, 248. 
6War Cabinet (Minutes), 13 June 1940, 165(40). Some American diplomats 
inferred war too. "Churchill sees in your note an absolute commitment of the 
United States to the Allies that if France fights on the United States will be in the 
war to help them if things go bad at some later date. Frankly as I read the 
message that is what I see in it." Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) 
to Secretary of State (Hull), 14 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 1, 249. For an 
opposite view, see Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State (Hull), 
18 May 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 1, 227. 
7War Cabinet (Minutes), 165( 40). 
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of war from Roosevelt. "[I]f you cannot give to France in the hours to come the 
certainty that the United States will come into the war within a very short time, 
the fate of the world will change.''8 This irony emerged on 15 June, when 
Roosevelt told Churchill that his message in no way committed the United States 
to military participation. 9
Whether or not American military support would have altered Reynaud's 
subsequent moves in light of the pressure on him to seek an armistice, the 
American reply did influence British actions. French capitulation drew nearer, 
leaving Britain alone to battle Germany. Churchill met with de Gaulle about a 
proposed declaration of closer union between Britain and France. De Gaulle 
asserted that dramatic support was essential for Reynaud to keep France in the 
war. The declaration provided for a constitution that included a single War 
Cabinet, joint citizenship, and joint defense, foreign, financial, and economic 
policies.10 The plan backfired. The majority of the French Council reacted 
8Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to the Secretary of State (Hull), 
14 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 1, 253. 
9War Cabinet (Minutes), 15 June 1940, 167(40); Secretary of State (Hull) 
to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy), 13 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, 
vol. 1, 250; Ibid., 14 June 1940, 254; Churchill, Finest Hour, 187; John Colville, 
The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1985), 156; Eden, Reckoning, 135-36. 
1°War Cabinet (Minutes), 16 June 1940, 169(40). Although de Gaulle did not 
foresee an actual fusion of the two countries, he believed the show of solidarity 
would prove significant. De Gaulle, Narrative, 81. 
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adversely to the proposed declaration. They expected instead a reply to the idea 
of armistice terms. The Council found the British move arrogant, provincial, and 
pompous. Petain refused to examine the declaration on the principle that it 
relegated France to British Dominion status.11 
That the British War Cabinet considered, yet alone drafted, this declaration 
illustrated its desperation. Over the centuries, Britain and France had spent more 
time as enemies rather than allies. To make such a leap of faith to complete 
political integration and to expect France to submit its sovereignty to Britain but 
not to Germany was peculiar, even under those dire circumstances. The War 
Cabinet's reliance on de Gaulle's advice, a newcomer defending the minority 
position of the French Council opinion, was unrealistic. The declaration 
represented a desperate eleventh-hour move to keep France in the war more than 
a viable foundation for a future. At the same time, however, the War Cabinet, 
though under strain, recognized that "such a proclamation raised some very big 
questions with which it was difficult to deal at such short notice."12 Future actions 
raised those and more problematic questions within a matter of days. On 16 June, 
Reynaud succumbed to mounting pressure within the French Council and 
resigned. Marshal Petain, the Victor of Verdun, formed a new government and 
established the Etat Fran�ais at Vichy. 
11Churchill, Finest Hour, 212-13; Colville, Fringes, 166. 
12War Cabinet (Minutes), 169( 40). 
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To avoid arrest and execution, on 17 June, de Gaulle flew to England with 
Major-General Sir Edward Spears. Once de Gaulle arrived in England, the British 
did not know how to handle him. On the one hand, he represented the remnants 
of a French will to fight the Germans, but he was an unknown quantity. On 18 
June, the War Cabinet agreed that de Gaulle should not broadcast on the BBC 
because he was persona non grata in France. The Cabinet hoped the new Vichy 
government would follow Allied interests. Later, however, after consulting each 
other individually, the Cabinet reversed its initial decision. Concern over the fate 
of French aircraft in Bordeaux and German propaganda against continuing the 
fight led the Cabinet to believe the broadcast would provide a rallying point for 
French pilots and citizens.13 Within the short span of one week, de Gaulle evolved 
from a newly appointed undersecretary to a potential symbol of resistance. 
An early change in de Gaulle's speeches illustrated his conversion. His 
broadcast of 18 June called on the French to keep fighting and get in touch with 
him. Twenty-four hours later, he spoke of his leadership role. "Faced by the 
bewilderment of my countrymen, by the disintegration of a government in thrall to 
the enemy, by the fact that the institutions of my country are incapable, at the 
moment, of functioning, I, General de Gaulle, a French soldier and military 
13War Cabinet (Minutes), 18 June 1940, 171(40); Colville, Fringes, 164-66. 
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leader, realize that I now speak for France."14 The confusion, tension, and disaster
of that week, however, merely set the tone for more uncertainty the following 
week and tenuous relations in the future. In plucking de Gaulle out of obscurity, 
the British ignored his own transformation, ideas, and personality traits. They saw 
him as a wind-up doll and thought they could program his words and actions. 
British intelligence operative F. W. Deakin described the prevailing attitude 
toward resistance movements: ''The idea of irregular warfare against a continental 
enemy had never been in historical terms a theme of enquiry in official British 
military quarters."15 Other countries had used guerrilla warfare since the
Napoleonic Wars, and with the fall of France, Churchill considered. new methods 
of military operations. On 23 June, the War Cabinet agreed in principle to 
recognize a French National Committee headed by de Gaulle but postponed 
official announcement until he proposed specific members.16
With the armistice signed, the Cabinet worried about the fate of the 
French fleet in the Mediterranean and whether it would fall into German hands. 
14Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 
Documents, vol. 2, trans. Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1964), 11-13. 
15F. W. Deakin, "Great Britain and European Resistance,'' European 
Resistance Movements 1939-45: Proceedings of the Second International Conference 
on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan 26-29 March 1962 (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1964), 98. 
16War Cabinet (Minutes), 23 June 1940, 177(40). 
Time was of the essence to find a legitimate and credible focus for any 
Frenchmen, including the fleet commanders, inclined toward the Allied cause.17 
De Gaulle's broadcast of 23 June preached sedition,18 which neither 
complemented British efforts to encourage Frenchmen to fight Germans, not 
other Frenchmen, nor ensured friendly control of the French fleet. The British 
still maintained diplomatic relations with the Petain government and hoped to 
avoid formal war with Vichy. Sir Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, 
wrote on 26 June 1940: 
Another day of infuriating uncertainty. Still no 
Frenchmen blowing any trumpets anywhere except de 
Gaulle in London, and his trumpet blasts are 
becoming a bit monotonous. The "National 
Committee" is still only a name. There are rumors of 
this and that notable Frenchman on his way to 
England, or, in North Africa .... Still no hard news 
about the fleet .... These Frenchmen have all become 
sawdust, or, if you prefer another metaphor, we see 
before our eyes nothing less than the liquifi.cation of 
France.19
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17Tbe War Cabinet disbelieved Reynaud's continued assurances that the 
fleet would not go to the enemy. The former premier had broken his 
government's treaty obligations to Britain and promises not to arrange for a 
separate peace. From the British viewpoint, Reynaud now laid under the German 
thumb with the rest of the former government. Ibid., 24 June 1940, 178( 40). 
18Colville, Fringes, 169. 
19The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-45, ed. Ben Pimlott 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 48. 
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On 28 June, the British government prepared a statement for de Gaulle's 
broadcast that evening. "His Majesty's Government recognize General de Gaulle 
as the leader of all free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in 
support of the Allied cause.'t20 The British pledged moral and material aid but 
narrowly interpreted the statement. As Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden later 
wrote that "recognition which H.M.G. have accorded to de Gaulle [was] strictly 
limited."21 The general was the leader of all Frenchmen who rallied to him in
conjunction with Allied aims but not the leader of the government of France. 
Colville wrote in his diary on 26 June 1940 that it was "never intended that 
de Gaulle should be any more than a rallying point for expatriated Frenchmen."22
The opposite occurred. Just as the British over optimistically interpreted 
Roosevelt's vague response to Reynaud's 10 June letter and wrongly anticipated 
America's entry into the war, many Frenchmen now read more into the British 
declaration than its authors had intended. De Gaulle thought his committee would 
be dealt with on all matters pertaining to the war.23 Two days earlier he had sent
Churchill a memorandum outlining his plans for a committee regardless of the 
20War Cabinet (Minutes), 28 June 1940, 186(40). 
21Eden to Sir Samuel Hoare, Ambassador in Madrid, 10 Feb. 1942, PRO,
FO 371, 880/32040. 
22Colville, Fringes, 172.
23De Gaulle, Narrative, 99. 
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War Cabinet's formal and final decision.24 French journalists who distrusted de
Gaulle believed Major-General Spears created de Gaulle.25 Some American 
diplomats viewed the announcement as recognizing de Gaulle's committee as the 
only sovereign authority of France,26 while others held to the British view.27 
Though the British anticipated that trouble would follow in the wake of the 
announcement, they hoped to avoid its consequences. A Confidential Annex to 
the War Cabinet Minutes of 24 June suggested that the British declaration had 
gone too far. It implied severing relations with the new French government. "The 
declaration had not, however, gone as far as this. But in any event those present 
at the discussion had agreed that we could not draw back. The waverers would be 
influenced only by strong action on our part. If we hesitated, they would give way 
all along the line."28 Therefore, a formal agreement of the "organization, 
employment, conditions of service and equipment of Free French Forces was 
24Ibid., Documents, 17-18. 
25Colville, Fringes, 172. 
26Deputy Ambassador in France (Biddle) to Secretary of State (Hull), 24 
June 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 1, 266-67. 
27Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 
1948), 806. 
28Great Britain. War Minutes, 24 June 1940, (40)179th Conclusions, Minute 
3, Confidential Annex. 
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drawn up between the prime minister and General de Gaulle, and ratified by an 
exchange of letters on 7 August 1940."29 
Not until the following year did a draft pamphlet describe formal British 
policy toward de Gaulle as established on 27-28 June. De Gaulle's French 
National Committee had jurisdiction over those Frenchmen on British territory 
and administration and military direction over those in Britain. "H[is] M[ ajesty's] 
Government declare that they will recognize such a Provisional French National 
Committee and will deal with them in all matters concerning the prosecution of 
the war, so long as that Committee continues to represent all French elements 
resolved to fight the common enemy."30 The words "so long as" precluded open­
ended, unconditional support of de Gaulle in the collective mind of the War 
Cabinet. The broadcast statement supported de Gaulle only as far as other 
Frenchmen chose to follow him. It did not elevate de Gaulle as the leader of 
France, but rather as a symbolic leader for those who supported him. A cover 
note attached to the draft pamphlet illustrated the deterioration of relations with 
de Gaulle. "The pamphlet shows the Free French movement in the best light, but 
29Draft pamphlet on Free French and de Gaulle and H. M. G. policy, 9 
June 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28213; De Gaulle, Documents, 24-26. 
30Draft pamphlet, 9 June 1941. Emphasis added. Apparently de Gaulle 
disliked the title French National Committee because it implied political 
ambitions, which he disclaimed at the time, so the War Cabinet amended 
recognition to the Free French on 28 June. This objection contradicted his 
rhetoric of 18-19 June. 
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it would be wrong to ignore its critics."31 The Foreign Office viewed de Gaulle as
a supporter of both the left wing and quasi-fascist sectors of French politics.32
Several incidents in the first few months of the war increased Anglo-Free 
French tensions. On 3 July, the British acted on their concerns about the French 
fleet in the Mediterranean with Operation Catapult. The British fleet sailed to 
Mers-el-Kebir, a North African port where the French fleet awaited further orders 
to disarm. The French Navy assumed the British fleet had come to fight the 
Italian Navy for control of the Mediterranean. Instead, the British Navy told the 
French to join the British ships in order to fight Germany, or sail under British 
supervision to ports in England, the West Indies, or the United States to be 
disarmed until the end of the war, or prepare for a battle with the British fleet. 
Anglo-French negotiations and the ensuing battle destroyed the French fleet. 
Catapult also took possession of French ships in British ports, such as Alexandria, 
Egypt.33 
Catapult proved detrimental to the Anglo-French relationship. Designed to 
demonstrate British determination, the affair eliminated any chance of the French 
31Ibid.
321bid.
33War Cabinet (Minutes), 2 July 1940, 191(40); Ibid., 4 July 1940, 193(40);
Ibid., 7 July 1940, 196(40); Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, 
Free France and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964), 76-79, 82, 
84-85.
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Navy joining the Allies.34 It increased not only anglophobia among the French 
population and Vichy officials but also collaboration with the Germans. The 
operation hindered de Gaulle's recruitment from London because of his 
association with the British. De Gaulle believed that the French fleet would never 
be used against the Allies. He was furious when he heard about the fait accompli, 
especially as it caused several large French colonies not to rally to the Free 
French.35
The joint Anglo-Free French naval expedition to Dakar, a West African 
colony under Vichy control, proved equally disastrous. Before the attack began on 
30 September, a security leak in de Gaulle's headquarters in England resulted in a 
surprise meeting with Vichy ships positioned south of Gibraltar. Dakar's Governor 
Boisson, who was pro-Vichy yet anti-German, feared a German occupation of 
North Africa if he did not order the inhabitants to defend the colony.36 When it 
became clear only a major expedition could overtake the area, the British ended 
34Aigiers Consul-General to Foreign Office, 12 Dec. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 
8325/32146. 
35White, Seeds of Discord, 100-101. 
36 Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State 
(Hull), 27 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1958), 48. See
also Robert Mengin, No Laurels for de Gaulle, trans. Jay Allen (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 1966), 128-30. 
the operation.37 Free French credibility decreased with the British, resisters, 
potential resisters, and opponents. The British Foreign Office stated: 
Vichy had been forewarned of the enterprise owing to 
indiscretions, if not worse, at [ de Gaulle's 
headquarters], and that de Gaulle had been grossly 
misinformed by his agents about the strength of his 
following in French West Africa. These suspicions of 
Free French reliability played their part in fomenting 
later troubles. 38 
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British support of de Gaulle wavered. "His Majesty's Government will no doubt 
continue, on the wireless and by other means, to dissociate themselves publicly 
from any intention of endeavoring to influence Frenchmen as regards their future 
form of government. "39 
War secretary Eden, who became foreign secretary for a second time in 
December 1940, disliked and distrusted the French and de Gaulle from the start.40 
Eden had little use for any Frenchmen, let alone the peevish and difficult de 
37Foreign Office minute, 26 Sept. 1940, PRO, FO 371, C10384/65/l 7; War 
Minutes, 16 Sept. 1940, (40)250th Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex; 
Ibid., 17 Sept. 1940, (40)252nd Conclusions, Minute 1, Confidential Annex; Ibid., 
18 Sept. 1940, ( 40)253rd Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex; Ibid., 25 
Sept. 1940, ( 40)258th Conclusions, Minute 2, Confidential Annex; Ibid., 26 Sept. 
1940, ( 40)259th Conclusions, Minute 2, Confidential Annex. 
38Outline of Relations between His Majesty's Government and General de 
Gaulle between June 1940 and June 1943, 8 July 1943, PRO, FO 371, 665/36064. 
39Lisbon Charge d' Affaires Scriveness to Halifax, 22 Sept. 1940, PRO, FO 
371, C10293/65/17. 
40He once told Colville, half-laughing, half-serious, "I hate all Frenchmen."
Colville, Fringes, 404. 
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Gaulle, because France irreparably humiliated herself by quickly capitulating to 
Germany. He seldom backed de Gaulle, preferring to leave Britain's options open 
regarding policy toward France and Vichy. His motto was "cover all bases and 
hedge all bets."41 Eden avoided direct contact with de Gaulle when the general 
acted outrageously. 
I expect that most of the Frenchmen you meet regard 
de Gaulle as being in our pocket, and consider that 
everything he says or does has our prior approval. If 
you bad to deal with him for a week you would know 
that this is far from being the truth!42 
He arranged for all Free French communications to the Foreign Office to go 
through French National Committee member Maurice Dejean, who served as de 
Gaulle's spokesman on foreign policy.43
Even though Eden realized that Britain built up de Gaulle as a symbol of 
resistance to Germans in France, be still saw an overall disadvantage in affiliating 
with de Gaulle.44 "Unfortunately the main obstacle, which seems to be 
insuperable, to harmonious relations within the movement and to harmonious 
collaboration with ourselves is [ de Gaulle's] personality and the domination of his 
41Eden note, 8 July 1942, PRO, FO 371, 880/32040. 
42Eden to Hoare, FO 371, 880/32040. 
43War Cabinet (Minutes), 5 Oct. 1942, 131(42); Eden to Maurice Dejean, 
16 Oct. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950. 
44E<Ien note, 8 July 1942. 
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mind by an extravagant conception of his mission. "45 With the advantage of 
hindsight to de Gaulle's later political accomplishments, Eden's memoirs softened 
his opinion of the general. 
I had the most sincere admiration for this great 
Frenchman's qualities. To know him was to 
understand how exaggerated was the picture, often 
created of him in the public mind of arrogance and 
even majesty .... His selflessness made it possible for 
him to keep the flame of France alive when in political 
and more diplomatic hands it must have flickered out. 
Yet de Gaulle was the victim of his qualities, 
for the fetvor of his faith made him at times too 
suspicious of the intentions of others. . . . On the most 
egoistic grounds of national advantage, it was to our 
interest that France should be strong and that the 
French empire should sutvive, if possible intact, but I 
doubt if General de Gaulle ever believed this.46
Other officials found de Gaulle's headquarters chaotic, his behavior a 
threat to Churchill's personal credibility, and his organization an embarrassment 
to British dealings with the French people and Vichy.47 Foreign Office Permanent 
Undersecretary Alexander Cadogan's initial impression was that de Gaulle had a 
"head like a pineapple and hips like a woman."48 De Gaulle's enthusiasm and 
45Eden to Halifax, 13 May 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965. See also Mack 
to Peake, 1 April 1942, PRO, FO 371, Z2813/161/17/31980. 
46Eden, Reckoning, 290. 
47Colville, Fringes, 276-77, 283. 
481he Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945, ed. David Dilks 
(London: Cassell, 1971), 302. Hugh Dalton slightly misquoted Cadogan's 
description, substituting banana for pineapple. Diary of Hugh Dalton, 60. 
devotion failed to overcome his lack of political experience or eradicate the 
impression he conveyed of an unnatural leader. Sir Samuel Hoare, British 
ambassador in Madrid, said the de Gaulle movement "excites interest, but not 
great confidence; de Gaulle is popular but considered unsuitable for the task of 
leadership on account of his junior rank."49 
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W. H. B. Mack, head of the Foreign Office's French Department, agreed 
that de Gaulle lacked an aptitude for the art of politics but disagreed that he 
possessed popular appeal or charm.50 More experienced leaders initially joined 
with Petain, such as Admiral J. F. Darlan, or refused to leave France, such as 
jewish politician Georges Mandel, or left France and the fighting entirely, such as 
former secretary general of the French Foreign Office Alexis Uger.51 John 
Colville wrote: 
There was no other available politician of comparable 
renown and experience. The lot therefore fell on 
Charles de Gaulle. He was a single-minded man with 
one supreme obsession: the honor and glory of France. 
49Hoare note, 8 Oct. 1940, PRO, FO 371, C10909/65/l 7/24313. 
50Mack to Permanent Undersecretary Sir Alexander Cadogan, 5 Nov. 1940, 
PRO, FO 371, C12069/24314. 
51Leger took up exile residence in Washington, D.C., and worked at the 
Library of Congress. On the eve of British recognition of de Gaulle in June 1940, 
Leger expressed deep concern over supporting such an unknown leader, believing 
it caused more harm than good. War Cabinet (Minutes), 178(40). Leger was an 
outspoken critic of de Gaulle in Washington diplomatic circles. Raoul Aglion, 
Roosevelt and de Gaulle, Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir (New York: Free 
Press, 1988), 184-90. 
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Scrupulously honest and unself-seeking where his 
personal interests were concerned, he was devious and 
offensive when he thought the interests of his country 
were at stake. For him any means whatever justified 
his only end, which was to restore the greatness of 
France.52
The British government struggled to ascertain the extent of de Gaulle's 
political ambitions. Originally, the Free French movement had a military focus but 
as British distrust of de Gaulle grew, so too did his exclusion from military 
matters.53 Major Sir Desmond Mor.ton of the Foreign Office suggested a political 
focus for the Free French54 but that contradicted the British principle of letting 
the French people choose their own leader. Just as de Gaulle's political skills had 
been questioned, so to were his democratic tendencies when the movement lacked 
a diversity of independent minds.55
Throughout the war, the British disliked much of what de Gaulle 
broadcasted because of the potential implications of his words but failed to 
recognize their own shortcomings and potential for disaster in their statements 
and actions. The Ministry of Information, under Viscount Brendan Bracken, 
52Colville, Inner Circle, 249. 
53Draft pamphlet, 9 June 1941; Outline of relations, 8 July 1943; Cadogan 
note, 28 Sept. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950. 
54Morton to Mack, 3 Sept. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28214; Foreign Office 
note, 18 July 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28213. 
55Eden to Halifax, FO 371, 115/31965; War Cabinet (Minutes), 96(41);
Mack note, 30 Dec. 1940, PRO, FO 371, Zl14/114/17/28362.
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regularly crossed swords with de Gaulle. Unlike the other governments-in-exile, 
the general frequently submitted copies of his proposed broadcast speeches long 
after the Ministry's standard deadline for review.56 De Gaulle attacked Petain, a 
tactic Bracken disliked because the Marshal was a sacred symbol to many French 
citizens. 
De Gaulle's independence sabotaged the British government's overall 
propaganda plan.57 Bracken spoke of de Gaulle's detrimental effect on the war 
effort: 
Propaganda should be presented as an indivisible 
whole. Talks, news, and entertainment should be 
carefully planned by one authority with a view both to 
short- and long-term policy. Not only should the 
propaganda to each foreign country be so planned but 
coordination between the lines of propaganda to be 
put out to the different countries must be ensured by 
the responsibility of one authority. If this is generally 
true of propaganda for all countries, it is still more 
true for France where our line of policy is a delicate 
one requiring the greatest care in presentation and in 
the avoidance of pitfalls.58 
Symbolism and reality conflicted in the delivery of rhetoric to the subjected 
people of France. De Gaulle threatened not to broadcast if the Ministry of 
56Ministry of Information note, 3 Jan. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 
Z176/114/17/28362; War Cabinet (Minutes), 19 Jan. 1942, 9(42). 
57Ministry of Information note, 3 Jan. 1941; Yencken, British Embassy in 
Madrid, to Mack, 27 Aug. 1940, PRO, FO 371, C9234/65/17/24312; Speight note, 
12 Feb. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 2964/114/17/28362.
58Ministry of Information note, 3 Jan. 1941.
Information censored his speeches. Bracken recognized the value of de Gaulle's 
voice over the ahwaves but feared that allowing de Gaulle to speak uncensored 
undermined the whole propaganda policy.59 
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Churchill, the most ardent champion of France in the British government, 
admired de Gaulle but neither particularly liked him nor forgave de Gaulle's 
constant suspicions of British motives throughout the war. 00 De Gaulle resented 
both the lack of attention given to his Free French cause and the British 
propensity for "professional decorum and habit to respect the normal order of 
things-that is to say, Vichy and its missions."61 De Gaulle suspected that Britain 
had selfish designs, which Britain disclaimed, on the French colonies, such as Syria 
and Lebanon.62 The general privately protested the term "minor ally"63 and
publicly protested treatment as one. "Over a period of 1,500 years, [France] has 
become accustomed to being a great power, and insists that everybody, and first of 
all her friends, should not lose sight of this fact."64
59Ibid. 
00Churchill, Finest Hour, 35. 
61De Gaulle, Narrative, 93-94. 
62Colville, Inner Circle, 249. 
filMinistry of Information note, 19 Oct. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950. 
64General Charles de Gaulle speech, 1 April 1942, PRO, FO 371, 
22813/161/17/31980. 
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Not surprisingly, Churchill questioned each step he took in support of de 
Gaulle, in spite of his admiration for the general's spirit. John Colville explained: 
"Almost the only obstacle to the surge of anti-French feeling in government circles 
was Winston Churchill."65 When de Gaulle's behavior irritated Churchill, the 
prime minister subtly pulled back British support. For example, when de Gaulle 
gave an interview in August 1941 that included several anti-British statements, 
Churchill told the governmental departments to "adopt a cautious and dilatory 
attitude toward all requests made by the Free French."66
When Eden replaced Viscount Edward Halifax as Foreign Secretary, 
Halifax became Ambassador to the United States. As American involvement in 
the war evolved from benevolent neutrality toward the British cause to active 
involvement by December 1941, Halifax served as a conduit between divergent 
British and American views of the French Resistance and Vichy regime. Already 
strained relations between Churchill and de Gaulle grew more tenuous as 
American influence over the course of the war increased. British support of the 
Resistance movement waned but did not disappear with the emergence of a 
stronger ally. Halifax reported that, to the Americans, it would be a "fatal mistake 
for the United States government to recognize any refugee group [ de Gaulle] as a 
65Colville, Inner Circle, 250. 
66War Cabinet (Minutes), 1 Sept. 1941, 88(41); Ibid., 28 Aug. 1941, 87(41); 
Mack to Morton, 28 Aug. 1941, PRO, FO 371, Z7696/114/17/28363; Outline of 
relations, 8 July 1943; Colville, Fringes, 439. 
62 
govemment."67 For the British, however, "tiresome though he is, General de 
Gaulle possesses qualities which are not possessed by any other members of the 
Free French movement or by any of the Frenchmen in London or the United 
States who have hitherto held themselves aloof. Moreover, he symbolizes 
resistance in occupied France itself. "68 Eden saw opportunity in this difference of 
opinion to sideline, at least temporarily, de Gaulle. He proposed a compromise 
that de Gaulle "should put his house in order and form a more broadly based 
committee, bringing in at least a few more of independent mind who do not obey 
blindly .... "69
Support of de Gaulle contradicted the Americans' Wilsonian principles of 
self-determination. The French population had not chosen him to lead the fight 
against the Axis. For many, de Gaulle was a British lackey with little support 
inside or outside of France.70 Personal animosity developed between Roosevelt 
and de Gaulle. The president found de Gaulle arrogant, bad-tempered, over-
67Halifax to Foreign Office, 8 May 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965. See also 
Assistant Undersecretary of State Strang to Foreign Office, 4 Sept. 1941, PRO, 
FO 371, 11/28214. 
68British response to Halifax, 12 May 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965. See 
also Foreign Office note, 26 Aug. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31966. 
69 Anthony Eden reply to Halifax, 13 May 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965. 
70See, for example, Memorandum of Conversation by the Undersecretary of 
State (Welles), 8 May 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 
511-13; Memorandum of Conversation, 11 May 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 513-14;
Memorandum of Conversation, 13 May 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 516.
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sensitive, and uncooperative. Those traits convinced Roosevelt that the people of 
France would never elect de Gaulle as their leader. Officials around Roosevelt 
also had little respect for de Gaulle and found him anti-American.71 British 
frustration with de Gaulle, in spite of its alleged support, made growing American 
influence easier to accept and harder to refute. Halifax stated that the Americans 
were not alone in describing de Gaulle as a difficult person.72 Just as Eden wanted 
to pursue all avenues of relations with the French factions, Halifax stated an 
advantage to American relations with Petain. "In this manner, whatever way things 
might develop each ... could benefit by the relations with the other."73
Even before the United States entered the war in December 1941, the 
British relied on the Americans more than the Free French, and the Resistance 
suffered from material and moral neglect. Churchill told de Gaulle that the British 
could not afford any major conflicts with the Americans. In August 1941, 
Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter, and the Americans might 
71See, for example, Memorandum of Conversation by Undersecretary of 
State (Welles), 28 Sept. 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 540; President of the French 
National Committee at London (de Gaulle) to President Roosevelt, n.d. Oct. 
1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 541-44; Memorandum by Acting Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs (Atherton) to the Undersecretary of State (Welles), 26 Oct. 
1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 544; Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of 
State (Hull), 21 Dec. 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 553. 
72Halifax note, 18 June 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965. 
73Halifax to the Foreign Office, 27 Dec. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 56/28326. See 
also Consul General Haggard to Foreign Office, 16 Dec. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 
56/28326. 
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construe recognition of de Gaulle as a violation of its terms. Article Three 
respected "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live ... . "74 In January 1942, when the Allies redrafted the Charter as the
Declaration of United Nations, Roosevelt refused to include de Gaulle's Fighting 
French.75
De Gaulle ignored the Charter's application to French territory, 
particularly Saint Pierre and Miquelon, two French islands ten miles off the New 
Foundland coast. In September 1940, many islanders expressed their interest in 
Gaullism and formed the Ugion du General de Gaulle, despite the Vichy 
Governor de Boumat's attempts to suppress the movement. Knowing that the 
Canadians and the Americans intended to take the islands, de Gaulle ordered 
Admiral Muselier and four Fighting French vessels to seize control of Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon on Christmas 1941. Roosevelt demanded that de Gaulle tum the 
islands over to Canada because Free French possession endangered relations with 
Petain. De Gaulle's actions frustrated bad American-Free French relations and 
increased Anglo-American tensions.76 Secretary of State Cordell Hull accused
7
4Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,
vols. I, II (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), 202. 
75lbid., 209-10. 
76Concem of the United States Over the Control of the Wireless Radio 
Station at Saint Pierre and the Seizure of Saint Pierre and Miquelon by the Free 
French Forces, 3 Nov. to 31 Dec. 1941, FRUS, 1941, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1959), 540-70; Concern of the United States Over the Seizure of Saint 
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Great Britain of initiating the entire affair since Churchill had given de Gaulle his 
moral and financial blessing. The prime minister, however, disapproved of de 
Gaulle proceeding without notifying the Americans and found the subsequent 
conflict embarrassing for the British and threatening for the Free French.77 
A British military expedition in May 1942 stifled de Gaulle's plans to 
reassert his military authority. De Gaulle had planned with the British a joint 
Anglo-Free French takeover of the French colony Madagascar because of a feared 
Japanese capture of the Indian Ocean island. The British, however, decided to 
capture unilaterally Madagascar on 6 May, which angered de Gaulle. The 
expedition may have damaged Anglo-Free French relations and dismissed Free 
French claims to sovereignty,78 but Free French exclusion limited provocation of
Vichy. The importance of Petain's reactions had increased with the Anglo-
Pierre and Miquelon Islands by Free French Forces, 1 Jan. to 26 March 1942, 
FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 655-71. 
77War Cabinet (Minutes), 26 Dec. 1941, 136(41); Ibid., 12 Jan. 1942, 4(42); 
Ibid., 5 March 1942, 29( 42); Ibid., 9 March 1942, 32( 42); Ibid., 16 March 1942, 
34(42); Ibid., 18 March 1942, 35(42); War Minutes, 14 Jan. 1942, (42)6th 
Conclusions, Minute not known, Confidential Annex; Outline of relations, 8 July 
1943. 
78Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State 
(Hull), 16 June 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 528. 
American invasion of North Africa, Operation Torch, which was scheduled to 
begin in six months.79 
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Another major conflict between the British and the French Resistance 
arose over intelligence operations. Prior to the fall of France, British Military 
Intelligence cooperated with the French Deuxieme Bureau. In July 1940, with this 
link broken, the British created the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to work 
independently and with resisters on specific military missions. According to SOE 
operative F. W. Deakin, the SOE recruited "individual agents for precise tasks of 
intelligence and sabotage, and to avoid as far as possible the centralizing 
tendencies both of the Resistance groups now appearing inside France and the 
Free French headquarters in London."80 Sir Colin Gubbins, head of the SOE 
during the Second World War, said the SOE combined elements of various 
government departments for the purpose of attacking the enemy with unorthodox 
methods. 
Here was the problem and the plan, then: to 
encourage and enable the peoples of the occupied 
countries to harass the German war effort at every 
possible point by sabotage, subversion, go-slow 
practices, coup de main raids, etc., and at the same 
time to build up secret forces therein, organized, 
79Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), 
12 May 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 514. 
80Deakin, "Great Britain," 107. This did not stop Free French propaganda, 
however, claiming de Gaulle as the "sole voice of France in respect of SOE work 
in France .... " Outline of relations, 8 July 1943. 
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armed, and trained to take their part only when the 
final assault began. These two objects are, in fact, 
fundamentally incompatible: to divert attention from 
the creation of secret armies meant avoiding any 
activity which would attract German attention; to act 
offensively entailed attracting the special attention and 
efforts of the Gestapo and S.S. and the redoubling of 
vigilance on their part. Not an easy problem, but 
somehow the two had to be done.81
Aware of incompatible goals, SOE leaders faced problems in the field 
similar to the Metropolitan Resistance. The overlapping of sections, hostility 
between British and French intelligence units,82 and animosity between British 
military and intelligence agents hindered operations. Maurice Buckmaster, a 
British intelligence agent, described many of the problems. "Subversive warfare 
was a new and untried weapon: there was no code for the underground warrior, 
except to think and act faster than the German security police or the French 
Milice. 1111.1 Because this secret warfare was new on such a large scale in the Second 
World War, an initial reluctance emerged among the military and experienced 
spies to accept these agents. Many disliked the independence these new spies 
developed and believed their unwarranted arrogance caused needless errors in 
judgment. Buckmaster continued, "the value of our activities was not easily 
81Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, "Resistance Movements in the War," 
Royal United Service Institution Journal (May 1948): 211. 
82See, for example, Speight note, 14 Jan. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 82/41904. 
11.1Maurice J. Buckmaster, Specially Employed: The Story of British Aid to
French Patriots of the Resistance (London: Batchworth Press, 1952), 64. 
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intelligible .... It was difficult to get the military authorities to take us seriously. 
What proved to be a new arm of the service seemed, in their eyes, to be an 
elaborate and dangerous charade."84 Agents could not disclose the specifics of a 
mission or its place in the general war plan, even if they knew, and had difficulty 
receiving material resources from the military.85
Hostilities between British and Free French intelligence overshadowed 
intra-British conflicts. The strained Churchill-de Gaulle relationship precluded 
most opportunities for successful collaboration between the SOE and the Bureau 
Central de Renseignements et d'Action, the civil executive committee of the 
Conseil National de la Resistance. De Gaulle "had to be rude to the British to 
prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out 
this policy with perseverance."86 SOE had been ordered not to work too closely 
with de Gaulle because he lacked solid support in Britain and Metropolitan 
France. De Gaulle made this order easier to carry out. According to historian 
Michael Bird , "The SOE resented the fact that Churchill had agreed to the Free 
French setting up an independent intelligence service, while de Gaulle and his 
84Ibid., 60-61. 
85lbid., 61. 
86Churchill, Finest Hour, 23. 
officers, blinded by an almost oveiwhelming inferiority complex, were bitterly 
opposed to any British agents working in France. "87 
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SOE resisted giving de Gaulle any real authority to back up his role as a 
symbol of Fighting France.88 De Gaulle wanted control of the two SOE sections
operating in France. The F section encompassed both French and non-French 
recruits who received directives from the British Chiefs of Staff and would assist 
in demolitions during the Normandy invasion. Historian Jorgen Haestrup found 
that many of the French recruits were those ''who volunteered for work in the 
section often because ... [they] did not feel at home in the de Gaulle circles ... 
"
89 The RF section consisted mostly of French people who conducted some 
sabotage but focused on an explosion of French opinion for the Allies to exploit 
later. Haestrup contrasted the two sections: 
The F Section was afraid of centralization and the 
inevitable roundups which it brought with it; the RF 
section had the duty of cultivating the idea of the 
centralized structure of all Resistance within one great 
superstructure. The inevitable overlapping and friction 
87Michael J. Bird, The Secret Battalion (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1964), 23. 
88War Minutes, 20 Aug. 1942, (42)114th Conclusions, Minute 2, 
Confidential Annex; Draft statement, 14 July 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31966; 
Foot, SOE, xviii-xix. 
8
9J orgen Haestrup, Europe Ablaze: An Analysis of the History of the
European Resistance Movements 1939-1945 (Odense University Press, 1978), 307. 
between the two sections' work was the price which 
had to be paid. 90 
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The F and RF sections created several independent circuits in France and 
armed thousands of resisters. SOE circuits and Resistance networks argued over 
who received the limited amount of available supplies. Delivering supplies to the 
Resistance had proven problematic. Infiltration through neutral countries 
permitted only small shipments. Sea delivery imposed a heavy risk just to reach a 
coastline, let alone the inland regions of France. Airplanes were unable to fly over 
enemy territory with minimal risk, especially early in the war. Difficult mountain 
airdrops exposed the maquis and their arsenals. After his first trip as de Gaulle's 
special envoy, Jean Moulin submitted a report to the British in October 1941 
describing the needs of the Resistance, which included moral support, 
establishment of intra-Resistance communications, money, and armaments. He 
requested three million francs a month for three networks, to be doubled at year's 
end. The money would be used to increase propaganda but not violence against 
the Etat Fran�ais.91 Although the Allies did not wish to incite a rebellion yet, the 
intensified propaganda conflicted with their emphasis on military aims. 
90lbid., 312. 
91 Jean Moulin, "Report on the Activities, Plans and Requirements of the 
Groups formed in France with a view to the eventual liberation of the country," 
(October 1941) Appendix E in Foot, SOE, 498. 
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With little Anglo-French Resistance cooperation, British intelligence and 
sabotage units received the bulk of available resources. This irritated the 
Resistance networks92 and fostered the perception that the Resistance lacked the 
necessary commitment to fight the Germans.93 SOE believed the Resistance asked 
British agents to relay a high proportion of inappropriate political messages.94 
Complications would multiply when the SOE combined in September 1943 with 
its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), into the SOE/SO 
under predominantly American control. The failure to establish good British­
French Resistance relations meant that Resistance networks would receive less 
moral and material support in future operations. 
British policy toward de· Gaulle developed quickly and incompletely in June 
1940. De Gaulle's symbolism was important, even during the times of strained 
relations with the British. Churchill expected the Cabinet to avoid the appearance 
of anything but blissful British relations with de Gaulle and solidarity within the 
Free French movement, regardless of reality. The prime minister often 
"emphasized the extreme importance of not allowing any public mention in the 
press of differences in the Free French movement. The movement was of the 
92See Mack note, 15 Nov. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B; Ibid., 25 Nov. 1943, 
PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
93Charles Peake, British representative to the Free French, to Mack, 3 Nov. 
1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
94Robert Brook to Mack, 15 Nov. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
72 
utmost importance, but its influence might suffer seriously if it were split."95
Churchill's motivation laid not in promoting de Gaulle as the legitimate head of a 
French government but rather in counteracting the image of Petain as the only 
savior of France. If other viable leaders emerged at anytime before Moulin's 
efforts to unify the French Resistance around de Gaulle, few in the British 
government would have hesitated to cast de Gaulle aside.96 Even Churchill might 
have done so without much remorse given the number of times de Gaulle had 
tested his patience.97 
This ambivalent and fragile support for the Free French coincided with a 
dual policy of developing de Gaulle's movement and keeping other options open, 
including one with Vichy. Even by February 1942, long after formal diplomatic 
relations ceased between Britain and Vichy, Eden advocated casting a wide net 
with regard to France. "Petain, of course, is quite wrong in thinking that we 
regard de Gaulle as our only French friend. Our policy is-and I have made this 
clear to many Frenchmen during the last year-to collaborate with any Frenchman 
95War Cabinet (Minutes), 24 Sept. 1941, 96(41). 
96An opportunity arose after the invasion of North Africa in which de 
Gaulle and General Henri Giraud attempted cooperation, but de Gaulle soon 
forced Giraud out. 
97Colville wrote on 27 August 1941, "I was on late duty and most of the 
time was occupied with de Gaulle, whose attitude is deplorable and whose 
pronouncements, private and public, are intolerable. The P .M. is sick to death of
him." Colville, Fringes, 432. 
73 
who is prepared to collaborate with us in resistance to our enemies."98 Rooker, the 
British representative to the Fighting French, reported a conversation where de 
Gaulle said to Dejean: '"le joue tout contre tout et je gagne chaque f oif.' During the 
past two years, bluff has stood de Gaulle in good stead. It is important to make it 
clear that cooperation, and not bluff, is the only policy likely to benefit him."99 
The dynamic nature of the French Resistance exasperated efforts to control 
symbolism and pursue all options and led to clashes and jealousies with Britain 
over SOE activities. British frustration with de Gaulle mounted over failed and 
forbidden military missions, including Dakar in September 1940, when many 
thought it would be his undoing, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon in December 
1941, when many hoped it would be his undoing. The British Foreign Office 
frequently wondered if de Gaulle would do less damage and be more controllable 
if he stayed in London or went to North Africa. Cadogan believed de Gaulle 
would be more effective in the Allied war effort if he remained on French soil but 
more controllable if he stayed in London. W. H. B. Mack thought de Gaulle 
would be more successful and controllable if stayed in London, but the Foreign 
Office would have trouble dissociating from him should the need arise.100 
98Eden to Hoare, 10 Feb. 1942. 
99Rooker, British Representative to Fighting French, to Foreign Office, 28 
Sept. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950. 
100Mack to Cadogan, 5 Nov. 1940. 
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The British government often fell short of its own expectations. The 
government pursued a foolhardy policy of building up an image of de Gaulle 
without taking into account the general's personality. Churchill found the 
Resistance valuable for future use but did not provide proper support. Sir Samuel 
Hoare, British Ambassador in Madrid, summarized the British policy. 
I have for some weeks been chewing the cud of 
ignorance about France, and my belief is gradually 
hardening that neither H.M.G. nor their experts have 
any solid background against which they could 
effectively defend, before a debating society of judges 
from Mars, their day-by-day actions and reactions to 
French developments.tot 
By the time the Americans joined the war effort, strained British-French 
Resistance relations could not turn around with rising American influence over 
military and strategic operations. 
By November 1942 and the invasion of North Africa, the desperate and 
vacuous gesture by the British of recognizing de Gaulle as a leader of those 
French citizens who rallied to him in June 1940 had failed. On 3 November 1942, 
Churchill told Eden, "I propose to break Torch to [de Gaulle] on the night before 
myself personally. I want no 'olive branch,' but a soldierly compliment about his 
men.11102 This remark illustrated the problem of knowingly creating a symbol out of 
101Hoare to Sir Orme Sargent, Foreign Office, Political Intelligence 
Department, 4 March 1942, PRO, FO 371, 880/32040.
102Winston Churchill to Eden, 3 Nov. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950. See
also Cadogan note, 8 Nov. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 90/31950.
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an unknown individual, without fully thinking through the consequences, and then 
trying to maximize the symbol's potential and minimize its independence. British 
relations with de Gaulle and the French Resistance movement as a whole during 
the remainder of the war would not develop diplomatically and militarily. The 
British misunderstood de Gaulle, and the general abused and snubbed the support 
of his early benefactor. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1941, an official in the British Foreign Office accurately described his 
government's relationship with de Gaulle. "In fairness to de Gaulle, it should be 
remembered that, as incomprehensible Frenchmen are to us, we are still more 
incomprehensible to Frenchmen."1 This mutual perception set the tone for British­
French Resistance relations throughout the Second World War. The Resistance 
neither emerged as a unified and efficient movement nor earned substantive 
British respect and support. 
The inability of the Resistance to unify and centralize power resulted from 
several factors. After years of unstable French governments and military 
occupation, an exhausted French population looked to several leaders. De Gaulle 
and Petain both believed France had to be saved to rise again but disagreed on 
the course of her salvation. They exemplified the vacillating French population. 
The armistice left its opponents dangling. Wartime conditions imposed an 
enormous strain on those citizens opposed to resistance and saw resisters as 
creating more problems for France. Resisters were homeless and had no stable 
past to promote and reassert. Instead, resisters advanced their own personal 
philosophies. A wide array of politically oriented networks and individuals led 
small loyal followings. Only 10 percent of the population participated in the 
1Draft pamphlet, 9 June 1941. 
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Resistance through most of the war, but the movement was larger than anything 
in prior French experience. Politics overshadowed early objectives of ridding 
France of the Germans and consistently set back unification at each stage. 
De Gaulle emerged as a symbolic and nominal leader of the Resistance 
because he had access, though tenuous, to the British. Still, de Gaulle's egotistical, 
authoritative, and opinionated personality caused tensions within the Metropolitan 
Resistance and with the British. The general lacked the legal legitimacy of other 
exiled governments in London. He had no basis on which to stake a claim for the 
political leadership of France, and the British avoided endowing him with such 
legality and responsibility. Many British officials refused to accept de Gaulle as 
the best intermediary with the Metropolitan Resistance and leader of French 
interests. They resorted to political games to thwart de Gaulle. The British were 
reluctant, understandably, to arm civilians without military experience. SOE units 
within France antagonized resisters because agents performed tasks the Resistance 
felt better qualified for and took away recruits and armaments. Without 
armaments, resisters could not act or prepare to act militarily. However just the 
British policy, it left politics as the resisters' primary outlet for dissent. 
Unification of the Resistance did not begin until January 1943 when 
Moulin arranged for Combat, Liberation, and Franc-Tireur to combine into the 
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"Mouvements Unis de la Resistance".2 Continued ideological differences and a 
deep distrust for one another ensured a fragile alliance. Combat's Frenay held 
talks with a member of the Vichy government in hopes of recruiting some of his 
old comrades. Liberation's d' Astier was suspicious of Frenay's militaty past and 
present dedication and temporarily broke off negotiations. Moulin's troubles also 
encompassed de Gaulle. The general tried to exert centralized control from 
London over the Metropolitan Resistance. He believed this would end continental 
rivalries and advance his program of attentisme. Interior forces strongly opposed 
outsiders dictating actions within France. 
In March 1943, Moulin added a national structure to the Mouvements Unis 
de la Resistance with the creation of the "Conseil National de la Resistance". It 
incorporated politicians, anti-politicians, trade unionists, churchmen, soldiers, and 
four of the major northern networks, which where the "Organisation Civile et 
Militaire", "Ceux de la Resistance", "Ceux de la Liberation", and "Liberation-
Nord". The primarily Gaullist Zone Occupee made incorporation of the northern 
networks into the Conseil simpler. The fifth major network the Communist "Front 
National" did not join this attempt at national unification.3 The Conseil tried to 
deemphasize ideology and supported de Gaulle as the symbolic leader of the 
2See also BBC Monitoring of Radio France, 2 Feb. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
318/41923. 
3Foreign Office note, 11 Aug. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 318/41925. 
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Resistance. Conflicts concerned the level of paramilitary operations, but the lack 
of armaments avoided a confrontation within the Conseil.4
In May 1943, the Conseil National de la Resistance completed its 
constitution. A few weeks later, however, the organization suffered irreparable 
damage, despite being under the nominal leadership of de Gaulle. The Gestapo 
arrested General Delestraint, Moulin, and the other Conseil delegates. Moulin 
died in a Lyon prison of wounds sustained from torture. Although he died without 
revealing Resistance secrets, Moulin failed to arrange for his successors and left 
the Conseil, in effect, leaderless. Questions about Moulin's motivations for secrecy 
have revolved around the need for security, his desire for power and control, and 
his possible role as a Soviet agent. Without a charismatic leader to fill the void, 
the Gaullist delegation left the Conseil. Georges Bidault, Frenay's second in 
command in Combat, finally took over the leadership.5
The Conseil National de la Resistance held only one more meeting before 
liberation in December 1943 in Paris. The Conseil agreed that its members would 
4A Mouvements circular to the maquis calling for enlistment into the 
united cause stated a death penalty for losing one of the very rare weapons to be 
supplied. Foreign Office note, 25 May 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
5Jbid., 242, 244-45. Ironically, after this structural disaster, British papers 
exaggerated the unity of the Resistance and its inclusion in the Allied war effort. 
The Times referred to the developments as a "national mass movement," and the 
Manchester Guardian stated, "[o]rganized resistance is looked to by 85 to 90 
percent of the population .... 11 Foreign Office note, 2 Sept. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 
36059B; Ibid., 9 Sept. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B. 
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consist of Liberation, Franc-Tireur, Combat, Radical-Socialist, Parti Democratique 
Populaire, Organisation Civile et Militaire, Federation Republicaine Nationale, 
Confederation Generale du Travail, Confederation Fran�aise de Travailleurs 
Chretiens, Communists, Socialists, Alliance Democratique, Ceux de la Resistance, 
Ceux de la Liberation, Liberation-Nord, and this time, Front National.6 Prior to 
liberation, other attempts at unification occurred but never equaled the one-time 
accomplishment of continental and Gaullist delegations under Moulin. The 
Conseil unified diverse networks on paper but not in character and effectiveness. 
Moulin may have accumµlated too much power for himself. He held the three 
important positions of president of the Conseil National de la Resistance, member 
of the Conseil National Fran�ais, which was the directing organ of la France 
Combattante in London, and General de Gaulle's personal envoy in France. 
Moulin, however, was the only trusted link between de Gaulle and the 
Metropolitan Resistance, and his actions may have been necessary. 
The attempt at unification came too late to improve the status of the 
Resistance with the British. In November 1942, the Allies invaded French North 
Africa in Operation Torch. When the subsequent Italian campaign stalled outside 
of Rome, Churchill increased supplies to the Resistance, especially the southern 
maquis. The Allies were in the process of deciding on an invasion of Normandy, 
Overlord, or southern France, Anvil, or both. Anvil meant Churchill could 
6Foreign Office note, 12 Oct. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 318/41926. 
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concentrate on Italy and possibly gain more of Europe. Despite his troubles with 
de Gaulle, which included stymying the general's words and actions,7 the prime 
minister promoted the Resistance in discussions with Roosevelt. He tried to prove 
to the Americans that resisters could play a major role in Anvil, which would take 
away fewer troops from Italy. Churchill's arming of the maquis gave resisters a 
false hope because he used the tactic as a tool in the Anglo-American dispute 
over the second front. Churchill told de Gaulle that Britain would not side with 
the Resistance against the Americans. When the Allies decided to launch Overlord 
in early June 1944 and follow up with Anvil, later called Dragoon, in August, 
Churchill drastically reduced shipments to the Resistance. The British did not 
explore the continuation of material support. 8 
A few in the British government supported utilizing the Resistance. 
Rooker, the British representative to the Comite Fran�ais, believed British, 
American, and French representatives needed to coordinate better supply 
distribution. "Failure to arm and to use the forces prepared in accordance with the 
wishes of Allied propaganda to fight in the enemy's rear at the moment of landing 
7See, for example, Churchill to Eden, 30 April 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
2870/41980; Ibid., 7 May 1944, PRO, FO 371, 2870/41980; Eden to Churchill, 8 
May 1944, PRO, FO 371, 2870/41980; Mack note, 8 May 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
2870/41980. 
8See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: a Global History of World War 
II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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would have grave military, political, and psychological consequences."9 Another 
British official said, "There is unfortunately only too much justice in the French 
claim that full use is not being made, and at the present rate could hardly be 
made before D-Day, of the potential support of Resistance groups at the time of 
an Allied landing. "10
Still, the British feared arming a particular group of resisters or civilians. 
Despite growing unity, if one network possessed a lot of weaponry, it would no 
doubt concentrate on increasing its own political position. At a meeting between 
Churchill and d'Astier in January 1944, the latter reassured the prime minister 
that the various Resistance groups would put politics aside until the enemy left. 
He pleaded for arms for the desperate maquis. Churchill expressed reseivations 
about Free French security, press leaks, and the Resistance's sincerity in 
unequivocally accepting Eisenhower's instructions on D-Day.11
Proposed D-Day tasks for resisters included interfering with German troop 
movements on railroads and roads, disrupting the German Air Force, attacking 
local enemy headquarters, harrassing the enemy generally, preserving or 
9Rooker to Foreign Office, 11 Jan. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 82/41904. 
10Aide-Memoire on current deliveries to French Resistance, 15 Jan. 1944, 
PRO, FO 371, 82/41904. 
11Notes on Prime Minister's meeting, 27 Jan. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
82/41904; Ibid., 28 Jan. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 82/41904. Some even feared that the 
French would fight each other after ousting the Germans. 0. C. Haivey to Peake, 
19 Sept. 1944, PRO, FO 371, 82/41907. 
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demolishing certain communication sites, fomenting civilian uprisings, and 
encouraging strikes and passive resistance.12 Not depending on execution of those 
plans, the Allies designed similar plans for the combined SOE/SO. The British 
also agreed that any political administration would submit to the authority of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff through a Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which 
countered Resistance plans for self-government.13 During the invasion, the 
inadequately armed Resistance managed to hinder the Wehrmacht's retreat. A 
better armed Resistance might have eased the slow Allied breakout from some of 
the Normandy beachheads. 
The Second World War provided the British with a new opportunity to use 
resistance movements as part of military and political strategy. New methods 
proved difficult to implement without mistakes and faced prejudice among 
traditional military soldiers. Although the French Resistance received more 
attention than other resistance movements in western Europe during the first half 
of the war, British priorities still ebbed and flowed as other theaters of war heated 
up, including the Pacific in late 1940 and 1941 and the Balkans in 1941. De 
Gaulle was irascible, tenacious, and perhaps vindictive. John Colville believed the 
Churchill-de Gaulle relationship affected Europe and the United States for 
12Appreciation of Strength, 26 Jan. 1944. See also Foreign Office note, 18 
April 1944, PRO, FO 371, 82/41905. 
13BBC monitoring of Radio France, 31 March 1944, PRO, FO 371, 
318/41923; Ibid., 1 May 1944, PRO, FO 371, 318/41923.
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decades. Colville thought the war in Indochina was de Gaulle's partial revenge on 
Roosevelt.14 The French Resistance did not play a larger and more dependable 
role in the Second World War because it lacked cohesion and focus. The British 
overestimated its ability to control a diffuse movement and a renegade general. 
Early problems in their relationship precluded future strategic cooperation. 
14Colville, Inner Circle, 247. 
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